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One Moore was the general agent of the United Life, Fire, and Marine Insurance Company, and of the Kenton Insurance Company, in Louisville. On the
15th of November 1867, S. & 0. obtained, through him, a policy of insurance
on stock and fixtures from the former company; and on the day following they
obtained, also through him, a policy of insurance of the same property from the
latter company. A considerable portion of the goods was lost. The first policy
contained, inter elia,
the following clauses: IIIf there is or hereafter shall be
made any further insurance on the property hereby insured, or any part,thereof,
without being notified to this company, and its consent thereto written hereon,
then and in that case this policy shall be of no binding force on this company."
"No agent of this company has power to change or modify the terms, conditions,
and requirements of this policy ***
without express written authority from the
principal office at Covington." Moore had at the dates named no such written
authority; and the consent of the insurers to the second insurance was not written on the policy as required; nor was it directly or indirectly solicited; nor was
formal notice given to any of the company's officers or agents, either of the
applica ion for, or the procuring of, the second insurance.
Hdd: 1. That the United Life, Fire, and Marine Insurance Company had,
through Moore, constructive, if not actual, notice of the double insurance; that
by the second insurance the first policy was not rendered absolutely void, but only
voidable at the option of the company; and that good conscience required that it
should cancel the policy (by returning a proper proportion of the premiums paid),
within a reasonable time if a forfeiture Weas to be insisted on.
2. That it was Moore's duty, when he obtained the second insurance for S. &
0., to notify them that a compliance with their request might work a forfeiture
of the policy he had issued to them the day before, unless they obtained the consent of the first company in the manner prescribed; that although they might be
assumed to have known this themselves from their policy, every principle of fair
and open dealing demanded that he should call their attention to it ; and that his
inaction under the circumstances was calculated to mislead and deceive them.
3. That S. & 0. had the right to expect that, if the company disapproved of
the conduct of its trusted agent in granting them the second-insurance, it would
take steps to cancel the policy, or at least, notify them of such disapproval ;
that, because the company did not cancel the policy, and because, in the absence
of such notification, the assured were permitted to rely upon the validity of the
same until after the fire, the former had waived the forfeiture, and were estopped
from setting it up. And it was not an answer to these positions to say, what was
the fact, that the company had actually no notice whatever in the premises, since
notice to their general agent was notice to them, and accordingly, his conduct and
default were theirs.
4. That the clause limiting the power of the agent to change or modify the
contract did not affect the conclusion, 1st. Because it was not pretended that
Moore attempted so to do; and, 2d. Because the estoppel which prevented the
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company's escaping its liability on the policy, did not depend upon whether or
not any such change or modification had been made.
5. That for these reasons the company was liable for the insurance.

from Louisville Chancery Court.
On the 15th of November 1867, Shea & O'Connell obtained
from the United Life, Fire, and Marine Insurance Company a
five thousand dollar policy of insurance upon their stock of merchandise and fixtures in the city of Louisville. On the following
day, they obtained further insurance on the same fixtures and
merchandise, for ther further sum of five thousand dollars, in the
Kenton Insurance Company. Both policies were issued by one
George S. Moore, who was the general agent at Louisville for
both companies.
On the 23d of the following January, a considerable portion
of the fixtures and goods so insured were destroyed by fire, and
Shea & O'Connell at once took such steps as they deemed proper
to secure from the insurers the adjustment and payment of their
loss. Before, however, the said loss had been adjusted with the
appellee, Von Bories and Klien, Graves & Enneking, who were
judgment-creditors of Shea & O'Connell, and whose executions
had been returned nulla bona, brought their suit in the Louisville
Chancery Court, making the United Life Company a party defendant, and seeking to have the claim of their debtors against
said company collected and applied to the discharge of their
judgments.
By the answer and amended answers of the company, it
appeared that the policy of insurance upon which the claim was
based contained in effect the following stipulations:1st. That all representations made to the company upon the faith
of which the policy was issued should be treated as warranties.
2d. That any omission to make known a material fact, or any
over-valuation, should render the policy void.
3d. That "if there is or shall hereafter be made any further
insurance on the property hereby insured, or any part thereof,
without being notified to this company, and its consent thereto
written hereon, then and in that case this policy shall be of no
binding force on this company."
4th. "That the aggregate of all insurance on the property
should not in any case exceed three-fourths of its cash value."
There was also inserted in the body of the policy the following
APPEAL
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limitation upon the general powers of the agents of the company : "No agent of this company has power to change or modify
the terms, conditions, and requirements of this policy * * * without express written authority from the principal office at Covington." It was claimed that all these conditions had been broken
or disregarded by Shea & O'Connell. Other defences were also
relied upon, which are noticed in the opinion of the court, which
was delivered by
LINDSAY, J.-The evidence in the case is conflicting, but we
think it fails to establish that any false representations or material omissions were made, or that the two policies in the aggregate
exceeded three-fourths of the value of the fixtures and merchandise on hand at the time they were issued. It is true, the officers
and agents of the insurance company speak with seeming confidence in their testimony fixing the whole value of the property
at greatly less than the insurance; but when their evidence is
scrutinized, it is found to be only their conclusions, based upon
an appraisement of the same, made a year before the fire. This
appraisement, they assume, included the entire stock; but it is
conclusively shown, by the appraisers and their clerk, that, in
point of fact, it included only about one-half. The witnesses for
the appellants evidently possessed better opportunities for forming
correct estimates of the value of the insured property, and they
all agree that it must have amounted to between twelve and fifteen
thousand dollars.
The consent of the United Life, &c., Co. to the second insurance
was not endorsed on their policy, and no formal notice was given
to any of the officers or agents of the company of the fact that
the same had been obtained, or even of the application therefor.
It becomes necessary to determine whether or not such failure,
of itself, renders the policy void. Similar stipulations are contained in almost every policy of fire insurance, but the courts
have almost uniformly held that notice to the agent of the existence of prior insurance will debar the last insurer from enforcing
such stipulated forfeiture.
In this case, as before stated, the first policy was issued by the
appellee. Both, however, were issued by the same agent, who
was acting for both companies. And, as notice to the agent is in
law notice to his principal, they both had constructive, if not
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actual, notice of the double insurance. The second insurance
did not render the first absolutely void. It was only agreed that
it should render the "policy 'of no binding effect upon the company." The insurer might or might not take advantage oT the
violation of this stipulation, as he chose; he could retain the full
amount of the premium and let the policy continue in full force,
or he could cancel it at will by returning the proper proportion"
of the premiums. Good conscience required that he should do
this within a reasonable time after notice of the second insurance,
in case he intended to insist upon the forfeiture. In the language
of this court, he could "by contract or conduct waive the right
to exoneration, and become estopped from enforcing the conventional condition of forfeiture :" Baer v. Phani Ins. Co., 4 Bush
247.
Courts of equity rarely, if ever, enforce forfeitures, and they
are looked upon with but little favor by courts of law; and in
this, as in all other cases when the chancellor is asked to enforce
them, the party seeking relief should be required to bring himself clearly within the letter of his contract, and to show, with
satisfactory certainty, that he has not himself been instrumental,
directly or indirectly, in misleading or deceiving his unfortunate
antagonist into the commission, or continuance, of the act which
involves the penalty. A different rule of practice would be violative of every principle of equity, and would, in many cases,
impose unnecessary hardships upon parties who had been guilty
of nothing involving an intentional breach of faith, nor even a
negligent failure to comply to the letter with some merely formal
,.nd unimportant condition in their contracts.
This appellee transacted its business in Louisville, through its
general agent, Moore. He was held out to the people of that
city as its trusted representative, and so great was the confidence
reposed in his integrity and discretion, that he was furnished with
blank policies of insurance, signed by its president and secretary, which, when filled up and countersigned by him, were
binding and obligatory upon the company. All these facts were
well known to Shea & O'Connell when they applied to him for the
second insurance. It was his duty to have notified them that a
compliance with their request would work a forfeiture of the policy
he had issued to them the day before, unless they first obtained in
the manner prescribed, the consent of the company for which he
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had issued the .same; and notwitlanding the fact that they
might have acquired this informaticm by consulting their policy,
still every principle of fair and open dealing demanded that he
shourd, before issuing the second policy, have called their attention to a condition in their frst, which it was possible they might
have overlooked. But he gave them no such information; and
though it may be asumed that they were acquainted with the
conditions of their contract with the appellee, it cannot be doubted
that the conduct of Moore was such as was calculated to mislead
men of reasonable prudence and intelligence, as to the construction placed upon the same by his principal. Nor do we agree
that the United Life Company is not to be affected by his conduct
because he was then acting as the agent of the Kenton Company. He was in point of fact at all times the agent of both,
and each was responsible to the insured for the manner in which
he discharged his two-fold and often antagonistic duties. It may
be safely assumed that the double insurance in this case, in part,
grew out of the fact that Moore was the representative of the
two companies, and as the officers of the United Life had full
knowledge that he was the agent of the Kenton, that company
ought not to be allowed to escape from the consequences of the
folly of the continuance of his agency, after the acquisition of
such knowledge, at the expense of parties, who in the transaction
now under consideration, have, at least, shown no greater disregard
for the obligations they owed to the company, than it has shown
for those it owed to all its policy-holders in the city of Louisville.
Further, Shea & O'Connell had the right to expect, that, if the
appellee diapproved of the conduct of its trusted agent in granting them the second insurance, it would take steps to cancel their
policy, or, at least, notify them of such disapproval. No such
steps were taken, and no such notice given; and the assured were
permitted to rely upon the validity of their policy until after the
loss of their goods by the fire in January 1868. It is proven
by the officers at Covington, that Moore did not notify them of
the second insurance, and for that reason they failed to cancel the
policy; but notice to their general agent, Moore, was notice to
them, and the failure of said general agent to communicate to
them information of so much importance, can only be accounted
for upon the hypothesis, that such a disclosure would expose the
fact of his dereliction of duty to his employers; and for this the
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appellee, for reasons beforeL given, isto some degree responsible.
Considering all the circumstances, we think that the appellee has
"waived the right to exoneration, and become estopped from
enforcing the conventional condition of forfeiture."
Nor do we regard the limitation upon the power of the company's agent to change or modify the contracts of insurance, as
at all affecting this conclusion. It is not pretended that Moore
attempted to change or modify the contract with Shea & O'Connell, and the waiver or estoppel which prevents the appellee from
escaping liability upon this plea, does not in any degree depend
upon, whether or not, any such change or modification was made.
Another defence is, that Shea &O'Connell failed to make out and
perhaps true, that
furnish the requisite preliminary proof It is"
the proof made out immediately after the fire, and forwarded to
the principal office at Covington, on the 13th of February 1868,
was not in strict and technical accordance with the reasonable
requirements of the policy; but according to the doctrine laid
down in the case of the North Western Insmurance Company v.

Adkins, 3 Bush 828, a substantial and not a literal compliance
with this regulation is all that is required, and in order to enable
the insured to do this, it is but reasonable and proper that the
underwriter should, when requested, furnish all necessary information, and when it appears that an attempt has been made in
good faith by the assured to prepare and furnish said proof, good
faith upon the part of the insurers demands that any material
defects therein, or objections thereto, shall, within a reasonable
time, be pointed out. It is proven that Moore objected to the
proof before it was forwarded to Covington, but it does not seem
that he pointed out the particular defects and objections, and the
conduct of the principal officers at Covington, in retaining the
same without objections for three months, warranted the conclusion that such defects or objections as had been pointed out by
Moore would not be insisted upon by the: company. The written
notice mailed to Shea & O'Connell on the 18th of May 1868,
required the assured to furnish certain books and papers, which
they had sworn were destroyed by the fire, and which, therefore, could not be furnished, and to give explicit information
on certain points, upon which it was impossible for. them to
speak with certainty, by reason of the loss or destruction of
these very books and papers. It seems to us that this notice was

686

VON BORIES v. UNITED LIFE, &a., INS. CO.

delayed an unreasonable time and no explanation whatever is
offered therefor. The amount of the loss was due and payable
within ninety days after satisfactory proof was made to the company, and the proof offered was retained until within two days of
the expiration of said ninety days, and then for the first time Shea
&O'Connell were notified, by those whose duty it was to pass upon
its sufficiency, that it was not satisfactory. This unnecessary and
unexplained delay was well calculated to excite in the minds of
the assured the belief that it was not the intention of the company to pay the loss under any circumstances, and that the objections to the proof were made only for the purpose of securing
time in which to discover grounds of defence against their claims,
and not with any idea of adjusting and paying, in case the defects
in the proof were cured.
But even if Shea & O'Connell had failed to make any attempt
whatever to comply with this condition of their policy, it was
nevertheless a cause of action, or debt, which the appellants had
the right to attach, and then themselves to supply this defect by
the best possible evidence within their reach: North West. Ins.
Co. v. Adins, 3 Bush 333. That they did this no one can doubt.
The evidence utterly fails to establish any fraudul'ent combination between Shea & O'Connell and the appellants, or that the
books of the assured were not destroyed as alleged, or that they
refused to submit to a personal examination. Whilst we recognise the propriety of that condition in the policy which prohibits
the assignment, transfer, or pledge of the same, before loss, we can
discern no sufficient reason why an absolute forfeiture of all claim
upon the part of the assured, by reason of such assignment,
transfer, or pledge, after the loss has been sustained, should
be enforced. The peculiar relationship of personal trust and
confidence, which exists between the parties to the contract
of insurance, is terminated by the happening of the event by
which the loss is occasioned. From that time the claim of the
assured upon the insurer is a chose in action, a subsisting right,
which may be reached by his creditors, and subjected to the
payment of their debts, and which, by the laws of this -state,
he may sell, transfer, or pledge at will. The condition in the
policy which is intended to deprive him of the power to exercise this right, is not necessary for the protection of the insurer,
and if it be upheld in all cases, will frequently result in the ruin
of the assured, by placing him, just as his means of support have
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been swept away by casual.ty or misfortune, at the mercy of a
debtor, who will not pay, so long as litigation can be protracted,
nor permit his unfortunate creditor to raise means, by disposing
of or pledging his claim, to those who may be willing to make
advancements upon the faith of the same. Such a restriction or
limitation upon the enjoyment of property is unreasonable and
impolitic, if not absolutely void, as held by the Supreme Court
of New York, in the case of Goit v. The National ProtectionTn8.
Co., 25 Barbour 189.
It may be possible that such condition should be upheld against
parties who, for purposes of speculation or extortion, have become
purchasers of doubtful or iniquitous claims arising out of policies
of insurance, upon which the assured would nbt likely attempt to
recover, but in this case, the parties to whom it is claimed the
assignment was made, are appellants in this appeal, and were at
the time reditors of Shea & O'Connell, who were insolvent, and
they would of course, whether they become assignees of the
benefit of their debtor's claim upon the insurance company or
not, avail themselves of all legal remedies to enforce its collection.
The facts of this case, therefore, do not bring it within the reason
of this possibility; hence, though it be conceded that Kline,
Graves & Ennekin, had once been the assignees of Shea & O'Connell, the forfeiture insisted upon will not be enforced.
That the proportion of the loss for which the appellee is responsible, is equal to the amount claimed by Shea & O'Connell in their
cross-petition, is we think established by a preponderance of evidence. For the reasons herein indicated, the judgment of the
Chancellor dismissing the joint petition of Yon Bories & Co., and
Kline, Graves & Ennekin, and the cross-petition of Shea &
O'Connell, is reversed, and the cause remanded for proceedings
consistent with this opinion.
We have examined this decision carefully, because impressed with grave
doubts as to its consistency with the
authorities in this country and in England, whilst anxious to avoid a disagreenent with the learned tribunal from
it emanates; and after deliberation we
are constrainell to note our inability to
accept its -conclusions upon the main
point at issue. The importance of the

subject, and the tendency of thepopular
judgment, induce the statement of certain reasons for our disapproval.
That the interests alike of insured
and insurers are vast, involving the
transactions of men in every branch of
trade, and that, consequently, the principles which must rule the calculations
of both classes in the furtherance of
their interests, are of importance, is
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evident. The law upon the subject, as
the source of those principles, affects the
entire business community. This comprises a number of experts whose chosen
calling it is to guaranty the safety of
the possessions of others, and a far
larger number of others, who, whilst
specially occupied in different pursuits,
must in a presecured indemnity engage
a protection for their possessions, cheap
whilst it is adequate. That the popular
judgment, gravely pronounced, orcouched in less fair innuendos, by the latter
only of these classes, based upon the
unsubstantial ground of prejudice, the
result of all business selfishness, and
therefore the certain consequence of
business success, is in the main unjust
to the corporations, is equally evident.
And as the corporations cannot materially affect that judgment, because they
are in a minority, and moreover, a
minority whose interest it is to avoid
an issue with the masses, lest by exciting
the exaggerated violence of opposition
which prejudice offers blindly to what
it cannot refute, they suffer the more
by their own justification, the double
labor of adjusting the balance which nowhere else is evenly poised, and of
dispelling prejudices which everywhere
else are working harm, falls to the
courts. Such gravity in the topic, which
must hitherto have impressed every lawyer, and liability to error on the part
of the public, which certainly has not
been without its effect upon some advocates, justify a dissent from the decision
of one bench by the light of the condusions of many others.
We will consider only the questions
of notice of the second insurance; and
of the waiver of "the right of exoneration," which the second insurance involved because not assented to by
eadorsement on the policy. The other,
and collateral, points of the decision
muast be passed.
The ground will be cleared by our

assuming in the outset, for our present
purpose, the accuracy of the doctrine,
that, in this case, by the second insurance
the policy was not absolutely void. Had
it been, there would have remained no
room for further discussion. And we
assume as of course that the agent had
no express written authority to change
or modify the terms, conditions, and requirements of the policy.
Upon this basis we conceive that the
conclusion of the court must necessarily
embody the following propositions,
although, as will be shown, it was not
by their means, and it was because they
were not examined, that the court arrived
at its conclusion.
I. The agent was impliedly authorized to receive notice; and by virtue of
his authority could also bind the company by acts having conjointly the
effect of a waiver, or operating by way
of estoppel.
11. The agent actually did, in point
of fact, receive notice; and acted in such
a way as to bind his company to indemnify the insured.
The points thus expressed, and others
which these involve, were overridden in
the decision by the adoption of one general proposition, to wit, that notice to
the agent was notice to the company;
and th at, accordingly, inasmuch as the
former was constructively notified, it
became the duty of the latter to act in a
specified manner, a duty of which it must
be held conscious, although ignorant of
the circumstances which alone developed
it. It will be observed that, if by the
two points we seek to decide the case,
we must examine whether or not the
agent, having notice, could himself act
in such a. manner as to estop his principal from setting up the breach of
contract ;-whilst if by the process of
the court, this ulterior question is excluded. And by this process alone can
the objection be disregarded which is
furnishedin the very terms of the policy,
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withholding from the agent any power
to change or modify the conditions or
requirements of the instrument. That
which, in our way, must be met, and for
ever bar our progress unless removed,
is, in the other, taken at a bound, and
left, still standing, but by the theory,
neither an obstruction nor a security.
For in the principal'case it is merely
inquired whether the agent had constructive authority to receive notice, and
when it is found that he had, it is held
tl. constructively he did receive it, and
that consequent.conduct of his which
worked a modification advertised in the
policy as out of his power, was not the
less binding, because it must be assumed
to have been, not his, but the company's
conduct: and therefore the advertisement was held to have been useless. It
is submitted, that an investigation which
thus excludes an important clause of the
contract, cannot have been conducted
with perfect logical accuracy.
But we find what we deem to be the
leading inaccuracy in another particular. There need be no discussion of
principles until the prerequisite is furnished of that actual notice which must
forerun their application. And we cannot
convince ourselves that such notice was
given. In our opinion, therefore, either
by the light of the doctrine which we
have stated, or notwithstanding the
theory of the decision, the insurance
company should have prevailed. In this
aspect of the case, after urging the failure in the all-important matter of fact,
anything more would be unnecessary for
our disposal of the question; but inasmuch as we certainly are liable to error,
and may strengthen the tendency by adding in this note to the instances of our
weakness, we owe it to our subject to
examine both of the points now suggested. We think,
I. That there was not proper notice
to the agent, although the facts were
capable of indirectly conveying the inVOL. XIX.M-44

formation which notice would have certified :
U. That even had the facts constituted proper notice to the agent, such
notice could not have affected the principal.
The proceeding being in equity, it is
true that, had the company had notice,
the absence of an endorsement of consent upon the policy could not alone
have required a decision in their favor,
since, independently of the fact that they
might, in terms, have elected not to enforce the condition, doctrines of implied
waiver, or of. estoppel, might well have
applied. Had the proceeding, however,
been at law, the notice, whether constructive or direct, without the specified
evidence of consent expressly provided,
for in the policy, no matter how clearly
that consent might otherwise have been
provable, would not have been sufficient in any event for the success of the
assured if resisted by the insurers
Hutchinson v. Ins. Co., 21 Mo. 97;
Carpenter v. Ins. Co., 16 Pet. 512;
Barrett v. Ins. Co., 7 Cush. 178.
What was the evidence of notice in
equity ?
Touching the general authority of the
agent, it is clear that in this instance
the risk of misapprehending it must be
held to have been assumed by the assured. Inasmuch as they agreed by the
written. contract that, to be bound by its
terms, the company should be notified
of a second insurance, and, that its consent by endorsement should be obtained,
they were under an obligation, when the
second insurance was procured, if they
wished still to benefit by the first, to notify the company. They must be presumed to have read their policy,-to
have studied it before accepting it,-to
have made every stipulation their own.
A different state of things could not
possibly be excused, and could at best
only be explained by an avowal of negligence. Accordingly, if they consi-
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dered that notice to the agent was sufficient, they decided for themselves upon
that sufficiency, and of course assumed
the risk of a wrong judgment. And
further, if they concluded that, not direct and verbal, but indirect and merely
circumstantial notice would suffice, they
did nothing more than to increase the
risk of mistake. That these risks, thus
assumed, were manifold and very grave
risks, inasmuch as they rested all upon
them with the view to obtaining the consent essential to the life of the first
policy in the very way which one clause
of that policy seemed expressly to prohibit, they themselves must, if intelligent men, have known.
Under these circumstances it would
be a more serious error than an inappreciation of the relative rights of the parties, for a chancellor to direct critical
glances, and apply severe tests, against
the company, excluding Shea & O'Connell. Whether or not the conduct
of the agent induced the latter to believe that notice to him was sufficient,
was immaterial, because back of it lay
the question of authority; and if they
were influenced by that conduct, in being so influenced they merely decided
for themselves upon his credibility as
well as upon his power;-from the
sphere of both of which decisions they
excluded the company. That by fraudulent representations, by some wrong, or
omission of right, a personal liability
arises, is the principle by which the injury suffered through the agent could
have beeu adequately measured and indemnified. That they who deal with a
man can profit by his falsehoods to bind
his principal, simply because they take
them for truths, is not a principle of
law at all.
It being their duty to give notice to
the United Life, Fire, and Marine Insurance Company, what did Shea &
O'Connell do ? It is a part of the case
that they gave the company actually no

notice whatever ; that they did not attempt to give the agent direct formal
notice ; that the subject of his principal's
approval and endorsement was not even
mentioned. On this score the assured
simply did nothing. They merely obtained a second policy, from another
company; but this they procured through
the man who provided the first. Having employed Moore when he acted for
the "1United Life, &c.," they subsequently employed him when he acted
Renton." And this was ll
for the "K
they did. It being, further, their duty
to produce the policy, and request the
endorsed consent, as neither act was
essential to the second negotiation,
which alone,. certainly, was the object
of their care, the performance of either
act could not have suggested itself to
them. It would be difficult to conceive
how, otherwise than they did, these
men could have proceeded, wittingly
designing the abandonment of their first
insurance, unless it was by the idle
ceremony of a surrender of the policy;
and yet by thus proceeding they were
held to have saved what must otherwise
have been abandoned. They did what
they had agreed not to do; and, considering their disregard of the clause
limiting the agent's power, we might
almost say that so alone they escaped
the penalty of the offence.
Undoubtedly, as a man possessing the
capabilities which his employment evidenced, Moore may be assumed, upon
general grounds, to have remembered
that the gentlemen whom he acted for
on the 16th were the same for whom he
had acted on the 15th ; but his thus recollecting a fact, as patent to them, did
not shift the burden of*any responsibility from them to him. This may be
said of him individually. Was he
bound officially to remember, also, the
-special provisions of their contract; to
assume the questionable position of an
interfering philanthropist, solicitous that
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his friends should exercise a care of
which they might well consider the suggest ion a reflection upon their intelligence ; to look out for the interests of
Shea & 6'ConnellI He may well
have concluded that the warning of the
clauses, requiring an endorsed consent,
and proclaiming the total absence of
power in himself to modify the requirements of the agreement, was sutficient
to inform them that his cognisance of
the facts was merely personal, and
could not avail them, and to insure the
line of action which, by its sufficiency,
it made obligatory.
Undoubtedly, also, for the purposes of
both companies, Moore was at all times
the agent of both; yet in the performance of a duty he was, as to that duty,
the agent only of the principal represented in the performance. What he
was required to do by the.assured, on
behalf of the Kenton company, could
not be held to have been done by himself on behalf of the United Marine and
Fire Company. In the principal case,
however, it was in effect resolved that
it must.
Hence we conclude that the notice
demanded by the policy was neither
proposed nor received; that such notice
as there was could not affect the appellees, whose duties, through their agent,
were all performed when the policy was
delivered, and upon whom no new duty
devolved, as their assent to the change
in the risk was not solicited. Moore
was not their agent to keep an officious
eye upon their customers, and to caution
them when he thought that they themselves incurred the danger of forfeiting
the indemnity they had secured upon
condition, for by no intendment of law
could he have been bound to do what
was not the duty of the company itself.
The possible notice of the second insurance, therefore, did not go beyond him,
and his conduct had no wider sweep,
simply because he had notice, and acted
only as an Individual.

It is true that, under the circumstances
of this case, the agent might have become the proper person to be notified,
regularly and in order, of the second
insurance; but under no circumstances
could his acts have estopped the company
from denying that they ever consented
thereto, unless by acts of their own (independently qf his), they were estopped
from setting up the clause prohibiting
his altering the terms of the policy without written authority. Thus, in our
view, the main question of law in the
case turns upon a provision which was
disregarded by the court, as beyond the
scope of the investigation.
We should fear that we exhibited a
discreditable degree of weakness, were
we to appear tender of rights of Messrs.
Shea & O'Connell. That they intended
to give notice, and to ask consent, is a
conclusion from the facts much more
difficult of belief, than that they were
ignorant, or forgetful, of the provisions
of their policy; that they were ignorant
and derelict because of their own negligence in not reading, or remembering,
that to which negligence only could have
found them strangers ; that, accordingly,
suffering through thriftlessness and default, they were entitled to no consideration in equity as long as the balance was
for this cause inclined against them.
Their suit derived alike its plausibility
and its success from the skill and the
wisdom of coun.sel, and not from any
honestly mistaken, yet deliberate, action
of their own.
We cite the following cases as serving
to illustrate the positions of this note.
In Mitchell v. The Lycoming .Mutual
ins. Co., 51 Penna. 402, there was considered a breach of covenant not to insure
beyond two-thirds of the estimated value
oftheproperty. The plaintiff, who, claiming indemnity notwithstanding an allegation of default, was unsuccessful in the
court below, maintained tlat there had
been no such breach. Both courts, however, ruled otherwise. "Failing in this,
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the plaintiff next resorted to the allegation that the defendants knew the fact of
over-insurance, and waived it. There is
no proof of actual knowledge ;-the contrary is expressly proved. But McCabe,
the agent, * * undoubtedly did know
of it, and made a memorandum of the
subsequent policies in the same writing,
containing his consent" (to an assignment of the policy). "This brings up
the extent of his authority, and his
power to commit the company by his
knowledge. He held a written appointment as local agent of the company,
under a bond for his faithful performance of the duties required of him in
accordance with the by-laws. The section read in evidence made it the duty
of the agent to take surveys and receive
applications for insurance, and when
required, to examine into the circumstances of a loss, and make report.
Under the regulations printed on the
back of the policy, the agent is also
empowered to approve of assignments
of the policy following a sale of the property, and to demand payment of assessments. Now it is very clear, none of
these powers authorize an agent to accept
notice of over-insurance, and visit the
company with a waiver of its consequences." * ** I"But the act of overinsurance is a forbidden act, and not the
subject of authorized waiver, by any
officer or agent under the rules and
regulations prescribed. It is on the
principle ofestoppel, and not of authority,
the waiver takes effect. The knowledge
of a mere agent, unauthorized to represent the company beyond the specific
powers committed to him, can not be the
ground of estoppel in a matter unconnected with the exercise ot his powers.
This can take place only when the
knowledge lying at the foundation of
the estoppel, comes home to these officers who exercise the corporate powers
of the company, or to an agent whose
powers relate to the very subject out of

which the estoppel arises."

(AGxEw,

J.)
In Forbes v. 2"ne Agawam Ins. Co., 9
Cash. 470, the facts were thus stated by
SRAw, C. J.:
"This is an action to recover on a
policy made by the defendants to insure
personal property of the plaintiff, consisting of horses, carriges, &c., kept by
the plaintiff at Great Barrington. The
policy had been duly issued through the
agency of Henry Wheeler, agent of the
defendants at Great Barrington, and the
fire occurred within the term of one year
specified in the policy.
"There were several grounds of defence specified, but the only one ultimately relied on was, that, by the terms
of the policy, the insurance should be
forfeited if other insurance should afterwards be obtpined on the same property,
not, assented to by the defendants, and
that such insurance was obtained; by
reason whereof the policy became void
before the fire." * * "The policy referred to the "application of the same
date, lodged with the secretary, which
said application shall form part of the
contract, to be taken in connection with
this policy."
The act of incorporation,
and the by-laws of the company are
annexed; and the policy, recognising
the plaintiff as a member, and acknowledging the receipt of the premium, deposit note, &c., insures him $1000 in
the second class of risks, under the conditions and limitations expressed in the
rules aforesaid. Article 14 of the bylaws provides that, in case any other ininsurance, prior or subsequent shall
subsist upon property insured by this
company, the policy, issued by this company shall be deemed and become void,
unless such other insurance subsist with
the consent of the directors, signified by
a statement thereof in the polioyq, or by
an endorsement thereon signed by the
secretary.
]33y
these referencis to the by-laws,
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and to the Iapplication,' and by the
addption of them into the policy, they
kecame a part of the contract, as conditions and stipulations, in the same manner as if expressed in the policy."
The defendants showed a subsequent
insurance without such consent.
"To avoid this defence, the plaintiff
contended that this subsequent insurance
was known and assented to by the defendants, and that they waived a compliance with that article of the by-laws.
For this purpose he offered a memorandum made by the applicant on his ' ap.plication,' which was on it when transmitted to the company, on which the
policy in the present case was made to
this effect, ' Applicant asks leave to
insure $1000 on same property in some
other company.
Please signify the
assent of the company in the policy.'
And this application was approved bythe endorsement thereon of A. D. Wait,
Director. It is contended that this is a
distinct notice that he intended to get
such further insurance.
"Buatwe think this reference is far
from warranting the ifiference sought to
be drawn from it. It certainly proves
notice of the applicant's desire to have
leave to make farther insurance, and
that this permission might be expressed in
the policy. But it was not so expressed,
and the non-compliance with such an
explicit request is almost as significant as a refusal. And the assent and
approval of the director was an approval only of the application and did
not constitute the.contract, or any part
of it." * * *
"But several other grounds of waiver
of this stipulation to avoid the policy in
case of other insurance, are insisted on
by the plaintiff. One is, that the same
agent through whom the policy of defendants was obtained acted for the
People's Mutual Insurance Company in
effecting the second insurance.
But
waiving the question whether any agent,

or subordinate officer, can waive an
express stipulation in a contract already
made and executed, or whether his
agency had not wholly ceased for the
defendants when he acted as agent for
The People's Mutual Insurance Company, his mere knowledge of the making of the second policy could not"
amount to a consent on the part of the
defendants."
(Vide Barrett v. The
AMut. FireIns. Co., 7 Cash. 175.)
In Carrugi v. The Ins. Co., 40 Georgia 135, there was a clause considered
which, regarding other insurance, was
the same, in effect, as that of the principal case. The policy-holder notified
the general agent of the company that
he should obtain, and he subsequently
did obtain, additional insurance; to
which the agent consented, though not
in a written endorsement. No provision affecting any power of the agent
in this regard was brought home to the
assured, who was held entitled to recover. The decision need not be examined here, as the circumstances were
materially different from those we have
discussed ; but the views of the court,
supported by dicta of the judge who
announced them, deserve attention, as
apparently conflicting with some well
received opinions.
In Peck v. The New London Ins. Co.,
22 Conn. 575, evidence that the agent
was authorized to consent by an endorsement to a further insurance, was of
course admitted (et vide 2 Conn. 252);
and when it was shown that he had the
authority, the company was held bound
by his act: N. Berwick Co. v. X. E.
Co., 52 Ile. 336.
Apart from the general interest of the
subject, we need scarcely regret that
space is not afforded us to enlarge upon
the first two of the above authorities,
since their distinctive features are well
marked, and their weight in favor of the
views just urged is apparent without
analysis. They indeed, it will be ob-
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served, go further than is required for
our purpose; for, as in both cases the
notice to the assured of the limited
powers of the agent, whilst adequate,
was less direct than in the present, so in
both the notice to the principal of the
second insurance, although insufficient,
was more positive.
The authorities

upon the general principles of agency
here relied upon, are familiar, and are
well digested in most of the text books
on that subject. Vide Story on Agency
J 135 et seq.; Note to Batty Y. Carswell
and Peck v. Harriott, I Am. Leading
Cases, 535.
W. W. WILiLx.

Supreme Court of _Illinois.
HENRY W. CANDEE ZT AL. v. JOHN DEERE ET AL.
A trade-mark is not different in principle from the marks or brands owners
of live-stock, which run at large, put upon them. The object is the same, and
that is, to distinguish the property be.ring it from that of another.
A proprietor can have but one trade-mark, and it must be in some manner
attached to the article manufactured.
It must have a practical existence, not resting in the mind of the owner, but
stamped or impressed or attached in some way to ,the article itself.
It is the actual use of the trade-mark affixed to the merchandise of the manufacturer, and this alone, which can impart to it the elements of property.
The mere declaration of a person, however long, and however extensively published, that he claims property in a word as his trade-mark, cannot even tend to
make it his property.
The law is well settled, that a circular, price-list, or advertisement, no matter
how frequently repeated, cannot constitute a trade-mark.
When words have acquired a generic meaning, one manufacturer has the same
right to use them that another manufacturer has.
There can be no property in letters and numbers, or a combination of letters
and numbers, where they are used to denote the varfous sizes and qualities and
patterns of the article manufactured.
Mlonopolies are odious, and a manufacturer cannot acquire property in the name
of a town so as to prevent another manufacturer from doing the same business in
the same town and from advertising the fact, so as to let the world know it.

APPEAL from Rock Island Circuit Court.
John Deere and Robert N. Tate commenced to make ploughs

in Moline, Illinois, in 1847.

In 1852, Deere and Tate dissolved,

and John Deere carried on the business at the old stand, and
marked the ploughs made by him "John Deere, foline, 111s."
Ploughs continued to be so marked by the appellees, or some one
of them, ever since. In 1856, John Deere commenced to use
letters and numbers combined, to denote the size, shape, and

quality of the ploughs made by him. Ploughs made by him are
called at ioline "Deere's Ploughs ;" elsewhere they are called
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"Moline Ploughs." John Deere advertised his ploughs as
"John Deere's Ploughs," "John Deere's Celebrated CentreDraft Ploughs," and as "Moline Ploughs."
Moline is a manufacturing town, and all articles made there
are called after the name of the town, as Moline tubs, Moline
buckets, Moline paper, Moline ploughs. In 1867, the appellants,
Candee, Swan & Co., commenced to make ploughs in Moline.
They branded the ploughs made by them with the words, " Candee, Swan &. Co.," in a circular form, on the side of the beam,
and the words, "Moline, is.," in a straight line underneath.
The appellees brand the ploughs made by them with the words
"Jo hn Deere" in a circular line, and the words "foline, Ills."
in a straight line underneath.
Both parties brand their ploughs with the letters and numbers,
"A No. 1," AX No, 1," "No. 1," "No. 3," and "B No. 1," to
denote the size, shape, and quality of their ploughs, and both
advertise them as Moline ploughs, and the public call the ploughs
made by both firms Moline ploughs.
The appellees, Deere & Co., claimed the letters and numbers
"A No. 1,' "AX No. 1," "No. 1," "No. 3," and "B No. 1,"
the words "Moline, Ills.," and the words "Moline Ploughs," as
their trade-mark, and filed this bill for an injunction and an
account. The court below sustained that claim, and the appellants brought this appeal.
.7as. Grant, C. Whitaker, and Ira C. Wilkinson, for appellants.
Hfawley & Pleasants,for appellees.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
BREESE, J.-(After stating the facts).-The testimony shows
conclusively that Deere was not the inventor of any part of his
plough, and that his great recommendation and praise is, that he
had the sagacity to discover to what profitable use the inventions of others could be applied, and, by a well-directed judgment,
he has constructed a plough not inferior to any in use in our widespread agricultural community.
But the question arises, Has he secured a trade-mark for his
plough, the appropriatingof which, to his injury, is deemed unlawful? To decide this question, we must first understand what
is meant and intended by a "trade-mark," and how it is to be
known.
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There are but few elementary treatises on this subject. That
a trade-mark is a legal possession has been recognised by courts
for many years, but its protection by courts of equity is of quite
modern origin. A trade-mark is defined in Bouvier's Law Dictionary to be a symbol, emblem, or mark, which a tradesman
-puts, or wraps, or attaches in some way to the goods he manufactures or has caused to be manufactured. It may be in any fon
of letters, words, vignettes, or ornamental designs. Upton, in
his treatise-and it is the only one we have seen upon the subject-says a trade-mark is a name, symbol, figure, letter, form,
or device, adopted and used by a manufacturer or merchant in
order to designate the goods he manufactures or sells, and distinguish them from those manufactured or sold by another, to the
end that they may be known in the market as his, and thus enable him to secure such profits as result from a reputation for
superior skill, industry, or enterprise: Upton on Trade-marks,
ch. 1, p. 9.
Assuming these as the proper definition, what portion of them
can one claim as his trade-mark, and can he have more than one,
and must not that to which he lays claim be so clear and well
defined, and the right asserted to it in the same shape and form
always, under all circumstances, as to give him an exclusive
right? And must it not be in some way attached to the article
manufactured so that it shall be exhibited in its whole extent ?
A trade-mark is not differefit in principle from the marks or
brands owners of live-stock which run at large put upon each one
of them. The object is the same, and that is, to distinguish the
property bearing it from that of another.
In respect to cattle and hogs, it is well known there is great
similarity between those of different owners, in color, make, fleshmarks, and general appearance. The mark or brand usually
decides the question of ownership, should a dispute arise thereon.
No one man can have more than one mark, or brand, and it is
required to be recorded. If the owner could have more than one
mark by which to distinguish his property, great confusion and
uncertainty would be produced, to such an extent as to defeat
the object in view. We have found no case where a proprietor
has claimed more than one trade-mark, and all concur in saying
:that the mark must be so clear and well defined as to give notice
to others, and must not be deviated from at the suggestions of
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whim or caprice. That it must be attached to the article manufactured in such a way as to be reasonably durable and visible, is
also conceded.- It must have a practical existence, not resting in
the thought of the owner, but stamped or impressed or attached
in some way to the article itself. Our common 'observation of
such articles sold in the shops, teaches this, and it is so reasonable as to claim the acquiescence of every one. Of what use is
such a mark, unless it be visible, and thus operate as a notice to
the public? We can perceive none.
That the published declaration of a manufacturer, that he has
adopted a certain word as his trade-mark, can lay the foundation,
or even aid in laying the foundation of right of property in the
word, cannot be reconciled with recognised principles upon which
such property can be acquired, or with the policy of the law in
recognising and protecting the acquisition. It is the actual use
of the trade-mark affxedto the merchandise of the manufacturer,
and this alone, which can impart to it the elements of property.
The mere declaration of a person, however long, and however
extensively published, that he claims property in a word as his
trade-mark, cannot even tend to make it his property: Upton on
Trade-marks 179.
With these preliminary remarks, we will consider: what do
the complainants claim in their bill as their trade-mark ?
If we comprehend the allegations in the bill on this head, they
claim the words " Moline, Ills.," stencilled on the side of the
beam of their ploughs in a straight, horizontal line, as their trademark, and this under the names of the manufacturers, or of some
one of them.
Complainants then aver that said ploughs, by their said name
of 1 oline Plough," have acquired a national reputation, and no
plough was sold as the " Moline Plough" by others than complainants until defendants commenced their manufacture at the same
place in 1866, and the complaint is that they stencil on the beam
of their ploughs in a straight, horizontal line in plain capital letters, the words "]1Moline, Ills." underneath their own names as
manufacturers, and sell them as the "1Moline Plough."
Complainants refer to their circular, Exhibit A, to sustain their
allegations.
"Deere & Co.'s Moline Plough
That is headed "Circular."
Factory" in German text, or old English, and in the body of it
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the public are informed that Deere's Moline Ploughs have for
many years enjoyed the reputation of being the best plough in
the West, &c. This circular is dated Moline, Ills., Sept. 1859,
and signed Deere & Co. There is no claim in this of any trademark.
In appellees' argument, their trade-mark, or what is claimed
as such, is copied in fac simile, except as to the size of the letters, and that mark is "John Deere," in the segment of a circle,
and the words "Moline, Ills.," in a straight, horizontal line underneath, with a dash between them. Their whole argument claims
that these words so arranged, and in this combination, are the
trade-mark, if any they have; not the words "Moline, Ills. ;"
not the words "Moline Plough ;" but the words as arranged in
the copy given by their counsel.
Appellees argue that their name and address upon their ploughs
is a proper trade-mark, pure and simple; that it indicates by
whom and where the article is manufactured, nothing more,
nothing less, and nothing else, and so fulfils most completely all
the conditions of the law.
This we consider an abandonment of any claim to the words
"Moline, Ills.," or the words "Moline Plough," as their trade-'
mark, and the mark being a trade-mark by being placed on the
beam, is a virtual disclaimer of all right to any other claimed in
circulars and price-lists. The question is then narrowed down to
this: Can one manufacturer of an article at a particular town,
whose wares have gained celebrity, appropriate as his own, to the
exclusion of every other person in the same place, the name of
the place, and thus prevent him from designating his manufactures as of the place where they are actually made? We do not
think the cases go to this extent. Though, as Upton says, the
simplest case of a trade-mark fulfilling the condition of the law,
and thereby entitling him who adopts it to protection in its exclusive use, is the name and address of the manufacturer: p. 102.
In such a case, no question as to the right to exclusive use can
arise. But it must be observed that such trade-mark has two
constituents-the name of the manufacturer and the place of his
operations or address; neither, singly, will suffice to be effectual
for protection'; both must be used.
Had appellants adopted this trade-mark or so simulated it as
to deceive the public, and with that intent, an injunction might
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be proper. How is the proof on this point? An exhibit is made
of the marks of these parties, as branded or stencilled on the
beams. The one is "John Deere," in large, heavy capitals in
black paint, on the segment of a circle, with the words " Moline,
Ill.," in a straight, horizontal line underneath, in smaller capitals, in like black paint, with a dash or rever8ed flourish between
them. The name of appellants is in smaller capital letters, on asegment of a circle, at least two inches longer than that of "John
Deere," and the address, "M
Moline, Ill.," in smaller capital letters,
on a straight, horizontal line, and a dash between them.
There is, it is true, a resemblance between these marks, as
there necessarily must be, the same lines being used, and the
same color of paint; but the names of the respective manufacturers are so different, and the space occupied by appellants'
names so much longer than that occupied by the name of appellees, as to attract the notice of the most casual observer, drawn
to it, as it would be, by the heavier body and larger size of the
letters of the name "1John Deere," and the names themselves
being so very different. No persons of ordinary observation
could suppose, in looking at appellants' brand, that it was designed to palm off his manufacture as that of John Deere, when
it told them, as plain as letters and words can speak, that it was
not made by John Deere or by appellees. Upton, in discussing
what is a violation of a trade-mark, says: "When A adopts or
imitates and applies to articles of his manufacture the name or
mark previously used by B as a designation for his productions,
the. wrong consists in the sale by A of his goods as and for the
goods of B." The doctrine is clearly recognised, that no man
can have a right to represent his goods as the goods of another,
and in many of the cases coming under our notice, it was shown
that the party complained of was selling his manufacture as the
manufacture of another. Nothing of that kind is pretended in
this case. In the circulars of appellants, they distinctly announce
that they are not the ploughs made by appellees, but are "1
Moline
Ploughs," and claim an examination and comparison with other
M1Moline Ploughs," and the testimony shows on no occasion, and
to no person engaged in the trade, were their ploughs represented
to be the workmanship of appellees. They claimed to such that
they were "Moline Ploughs," but superior to the Deere plough,
and there is no proof that they are inferior.
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Were appellants violating any right of appellees in so representing them ? It is in proof the ploughs manufactured at
Moline by Kinsey were branded "Moline, Ills.," and those made
by Beery in the same manner, and that various articles manufactured at that place are so branded. The words have acquired a
generic meaning, and one manufacturer at Moline has the same
right to use them that any other manufacturer there has.
A case illustrative of this idea is found in 19 Pick. 214, the
case of Thomplon v. Winchester, where' it was held that if the
defendant made and sold medicines, calling them "Thomsonian,"
as a generic term, designating their general character, but did
not offer or sell them nor consign them to others to sell, as and
for medicines made and prepared by the plaintiff, and if he made
and compounded such medicines of bad materials, with inadequate
skill, by means whereof the credit and character of all Thomsonian
medicines were brought into disrepute,.the plaintiff could recover
no damages; no infringement of plaintiff's right was shown.
Appellees have no patent upon any portion of their ploughs;
any one therefore has a perfect right to make ploughs, in their
exact similitude, even to the curve of the mould-board, and "the
tip of the handles," in. the minutest, as well as in the most important, points; any one has a right to manufacture them, no matter
where the maker may reside, and has the right to put the name
of the place where manufactured, as well as his own name, on
such part of the ploughs as he pleases, taking care, however, so
to use the brand as not to deceive the public, so as not to create
a belief that the plough is the manufacture of another.
In appellees' bill they claim the words "Moline, Ills.," and
"Moline Plough," as words to which they have an exclusive right
when used to designate ploughs, and so the Circuit Court must
have understood it, for the very language of the finding is, that
the complainants' bill is true, and that they are entitled to the
exclusive use as a trade-mark, in the manufacture and sale of
ploughs, of the words "Moline Plough ;" also to the various letters, figures, numbers, and combinations as used and applied by
them as set forth and contained in Exhibit A, attached to their
bill, and used by them to designate the various sizes, shapes, and
patterns of ploughs manufactured and sold by them.
The decree is still more comprehensive.
It is decreed that the defendants, and each of them, their
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ageftts and servants, be for ever restrained and enjoined in any
way from calling or advertising themselves as "The Moline Plough
Company," or "Moline Plough Co.," or similar words, and from
advertising, calling, selling, or placing upon the ploughs made or
to be made by them, or any or either of them, the name of "The
Moline Plough," or " Moline Plough," or "Moline Ploughs," or
other words or names in imitation of the said trade-mark of said
complainants, or any part thereof, or in any way or manner using
the word "Moline," either upon their ploughs, or in advertising
the same, as in any way designating, pointing out, or indicating
the manufacture of defendants, or in any other way, except in
connection with such word or words as shall, and shall only, point
out and designate the place where the defendants manufacture

ploughs.
The decree further enjoins appellants from using or placing
upon their ploughs any of the letters, numbers, or figures or combinations, like those placed upon complainants' ploughs, and used
by them to indicate the various sizes, shapes, and patterns of such
ploughs; and they are further enjoined from branding, stencilling,
or otherwise placing upon their ploughs the words "Candee, Swan
3 Co.," or other words in a circular form, in imitation of the
complainants' brand, upon the beam of any such plough or ploughs,
over the words Moline,.llinois, or any abbreviation of such words
or either thereof.
We are not mistaken, therefore, when we say that the trademark claimed by this bill, and found by the court, is the words
"Moline Plough," to which they are entitled to the exclusive use,
and not the words "Joh n Deere," on thr segment of a circle, with
"Moline, Ill." on a straight, horizontal line underneath. The
finding and decree follows the bill, and shows the same case.
If this then be the trade-mark, it is of no value, as it has never
been applied by appellees to any plough they have manufactured,
or attached to it in any way, and if they had so done, there
is not a particle of proof appellants have affixed it to any plough
of their manufacture. The law is well settled, that a circular,
price list, or advertisement, no matter how frequently repeated,
cannot constitute a trade-mark, and it is only in that way appellees have used, and appellants also, using it as a generic term,
which they had a clear right to do. Is it possible-can it be
tolerated for a single moment, that a maker of ploughs at Moline
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shall not be permitted to sell his work as a Moline plough, to advertise them in every form as the Moline plough? Would it not
be the truth, and shall a manufacturer be prevented from publishing to the world where his wares are made?
In what could a contrary notion result, but in a monstrous
monopoly? If, to the exactions committed upon the agricultural
portion of our people, by the patentees of reapers and mowers,
implements now indispensable, there shall be superadded a monopoly in the manufacture and sale of the plough at a point so
important as Moline, how shall the farmers bear this grievous and
oppressive burden ?
Shall it be said that because appellants have branded their
pumps, which it appears by the testimony they manufacture,
"Moline, Ill.," no other manufacturer of pumps at that place
shall so brand his?
Shall it be said that any man or association of men can so
appropriate the name of a town where manufactures can be
carried on in the most extensive manner, and on a gigantic scale,
such will be her increased facilities, by the expenditure by the
government of large sums of money to that end?
Monopolies are odious, against which the public sentiment has
ever revolted; and what can be more odious and oppressive than
the monopoly of the manufacture and sale of ploughs? If it can
be claimed by the association at Moline, it can also be claimed for
Peru, Peoria, Chicago, and the various other places at which these
implements are largely made.
In a very recent English case, plaintiffs had been for many
years manufacturers of starch at a small hamlet in Scotland, called
Glenfield, where it was said a stream of water particularly suited
for making that article, flowed. Under the name of "Glenfield
Starch," their goods had acquired a good reputation.
In 1868 the defendants set up starch works at Glenfield, and
sold starch in packets labelled "C. & Co., Starch Manufacturers,
Glenfield." In color alone those labels resembled those of plaintiffs'; but it was shown that the colors selected were common to
almost all starch makers. Held, on bill filed for an injunction,
that the defendants were entitled to manufacture starch at Glenfield, and doing so, to describe their goods as made there, and
themselves of that place; that even if they had chosen that place
for their works expressly because the name had become known in
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the markets, and with the intention of introducing that name as
part of the description of themselves and their goods, it was open
to them to do so, and therefore, as the ]abels and inscriptions in
no way imitated those of the plaintiffs', an injunction originally
granted by MALINS, V. C., was, on appeal, dissolved: JWotherspoon v. Carrie, 23 Law Times Reports 443.
This case bears upon the case before us. What is to be understood by the closing paragraph is, that starch being put up for
market in packages, is labelled in such a way as to constitute
a trade-mark, and as the defendants' labels did not imitate those
of plaintiffs, except in color, as stated before, there could be no
piracy of the trade-mark that did not consist in the word " Glenfield." So in this case, if the trade-mark" of appellees is as
charged in the bill, and as found by the court, there has been no
piracy, and the same reasons that induced competition in the
manufacture of starch at Glenfield, that starch made there had
a great reputation, and that defendants had a right to select that
place on that account, because the name had become known in the
market, so here, appellants were justified in commencing their
operations at Moline, because the ploughs manufactured at that
place had obtained a great reputation through the exertions of
appellees, or of their head, Mr. Deere.
Any numlbr of plough makers can go with impunity to Moline
and establish there plough factories and brand on their ploughs
their own names and the name of the town, and send them broadcast over the country, to the joy of our farmers and to the common
benefit of all. But the court went in their decree to the full
extent of the claim of appellees; and decided they had a property
in the letters, figures, and numbers placed on their ploughs, with
this modification; whereas, it is charged in the bill that the
ploughs manufactured by complainants have been of various qualities, sizes, and patterns for different qualities and conditions of
soil, and for different operations, and distinguished by different
names, letters, and numbers; and further referring to Exhibit A.
their ploughs are spoken of as of different qualities, sizes, and
patterns, the various sizes, shapes, and patterns of ploughs. It
is in proof by two of appellees' witnesses, G. W. Vinton, one of
appellees, and C. G. Bryant, that they designated the different
sizes, qualitie8, and patterns, by numbers, from one to nine inclusive, put on the top of the beam next to the standard, and as they -
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modified them from time to time, to suit the demand, they added
numbers and fractions of numbers. He also says, "the same
letters, figures, and numbers appear oni defendants' ploughs, corresponding with those we use, and they appear in the same form,
style and appearance, and designate the same style and quality
of ploughs as our own." On cross-examination he says, these
letters and numbers denote the size, quality, shape, and brand of
the ploughs.
Charles G. Bryant says he is familiar with Deere's numbers
and figures and combinations, as applied to their ploughs, and they
designate the size, shape, and quality, of the various kinds of
ploughs on their price list, to which they are applied, and on crossexamination he says, makers of ploughs, generally, mark them
with letters and numbers, or combinations of letters and numbers,
to denote the size, shape, and quality of ploughs made by them.
That one cannot have a property in letters, figures, and words used
for such purposes seems to be settled by the authorities.
It was held in the case of Stokes v. Landgroff, 17 Barb. 608,
referring to Amoskeag Manf. Co. v. Spear, 2 Sandf. S. C. 599,
in respect to words or devices which do not denote the goods or
property or particular place of business of a person, but only the
nature, kind, or quality of the article in which he deals, a different rule prevails, no property in such words, marks, or devices,
can be acquired. There is, obviously, no good reason why one
person should have any better right to use them than another.
They may be used by many different persons at the same time in
their brands, marks, or labels on their respective goods, witlU perfect truth and fairness.
They signify nothing, when fairly interpreted, by which any
value in a similar article could be defrauded.
The case of the Amoskeag Manf. Co. v. Spear is said to' be
the leading American case on the question of trade-marks, and in
that it was held, that although by the long-continued use of certain words, letters, marks, or symbols, which do not, of themselves,
and were not designed to indicate the origin or ownership of the
goods to which they are affixed, the goods so marked, and because
so marked have become known as those of the manufacturer who
first used them, such fact cannot alter the original meaning of the
words or symbols, or the intent with which they were first used,
as denoting the name of the thing or its general or relative quality,
I
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or take from others the right to employ them in -the same sense.
This portion of the claim set up by appellees must fall to the
ground, as well as the claim based upon the use of the word
"Moline" used to designate appellants' plQughs.
It is very apparent from the whole tenor of appellees' bill, their
claim is founded on the fact that their ploughs were sold by them
as the " oline Plough," and not by the name of the manufacturer, and as that is only a generic term, it is seen they can claim
no exclusive right to the use of that name by which to designate
their manufacture. Thompson v. Winchester, supra, and to which

citation should be added Singleton v. Bolton, 3 Doug. 293; Canlam
v. Jones, 2 Yes. & Bea. 218, and Per v. Trzuefitt, 6 Beav. 66.
These cases are all decided on the principle that the name used
in the respective cases had become generic-merely descriptive
of the kind or quality of the article to which they were respectively applied, without reference to any particular manufacturer.
Suppose the law required such person claiming a trade-mark,
to record the same, how would that of appellees appear on the
record? If by these letters and figures or a combination of them,
the law is settled they are no basis for the claim of the words
"1Moline Ploughs," the law is equally well settled that no exclusive right can be had in them; if in the form presented by the
counsel for appellees in their brief, "John Deere" inscribed on
the segment of a eircle, and the words "Moline, Ills.," in a
straight, horizontal line underneath, it is not so claimed in the
bill, and if it was, there is no proof that such trade-mark has been
I
violated by appellants.
But it seems to us, it is not quite clear what appellees intend
is, and shall be their trade-mark. It is not made ou to our satisfaction, and we believe the rule to be in such cases, the proof
must be clear, leaving the question beyond a reasonable doubt.
It is not possible for us, even if it were necessary, as it is not,
to review the many cases cited on the argument. There is not
entire harmony in them; but one of the most important principles
deducible from them is, that when a trade-mark is violated, the
essence of the wrong done consists in the sale of the goods of the
manufacturer, as and for the goods of another, and therefore, that
such violation can only be predicated on a copy or imitation of a
trade-mark, or those portions of a trade-mark which truly designate the origin or ownership of 'the goods ; and another is, that
VOL. XIX.-45
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a similarity between two trade-marks used by different manufacturers for their goods, although of such a character as to induce
a belief in the mind of the public that they belong to and designate the goods of the same manufacture or trade, is not of itself
sufficient ground for a prohibition of the use of such trade-mark
by him who did not first adopt it. That similarity, to entitle the
originator to the protection of the law, must be such as to amount
to a false representation-not alone that the two articles have the
same origin, but that the goods to which the simulated mark is
attached are the manufacture of him who first appropriated the
trade-mark: Amoskeag Afanf. Co. v. Spear, supra; Upton on
Trade-Marks 136.
Testing this case by these principles it has no foundation. On
the part of appellants, the essence of the wrong alleged to be
done is absent; and though a similarity may exist in this mark or
brand of appellants with that of appellees, if the words "John
Deere," printed in capital letters on the segment of a circle, with
the name "Moline, Ill.," on a straight, horizontal line, also in
capital letters, be their trade-mark, which is not so alleged in the
bill, or proved or found by the court, it is not such as to amount to
a false representation that the goods of appellant, bearing his
brand, had the same origin and were of the manufacture of appellees--if they did, in fact, first appropriate it as a trade-mark.
'On this point there is no evidence whatever. There was no
pretension by appellees of a trade-mark until appellants commenced to manufacture, and that successfully, ploughs at Moline,
and which they published far and wide as the Moline Plough, and
thus interfered with the monopoly appellees had created. For
their audacity in so interfering, the sternest decrees of the law
are invoked, but in this court the invocation will be vain on such
facts as are presented by this record.
We forbear any discussion of the questions presented by the
supplemental bill, deeming it unnecessary, satisfied as we are
that appellees have no standing in a court of equity; and for
the same reason decline the discussion of the question how far
complainants under Deere may be protected in any trade-mark he
may have had and used.
Entertaining the views herein expressed, the decree of the
Circuit Court must be reversed, the injunction dissolved, and the
bill dismissed.
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A mere mark or symbol which can x that all the manufacturers of lead penused by one with as much propriety &,s cilsnearNuremberg, of which there were
the other, cannot become a trade-mark. * about twenty, put up their pencils in the
So held when an injunction was denied same way. The court held that both
as to the letters A. C. A., these letters parties had a right to mark their names
being used by both parties on tickings on pencils made by them; and that there
manufactured by them, to denote their * was nothing peculiar in the way in
quality: Amoskeag ManufacturingCo. v. which plaintiffs marked their pencils.
Spear, 2 Sandi. S. C. 599. Injunc- Thetinjunction was therefore denied:
tion denied as to the words "Galen,"
FaberT. Faber, 49 Barb. 357.
Two firms of the same name, carry"Lake," "9Cylinder," "Wayne," and
"New York," they being used to denote ing on the same kind of business in two
the quality of the glass made by both different places; the one cannot acquire
parties: Stokes v. Sdndgraff, 17 Barb. a trade-mark in its name as against the
608. Injunction denied as to the words other: Rogers et al. ,. Saintor, 97
"Burgess's Essence of Anchovy:" Mass. 291.
Burgess v. Burgess, 3 De G. M. & G.
Advertisements alone cannot make a
trade-mark. The mark, sign, or sym896.
The mark must denote the origin or bol must be affixed to the article:
ownership of the goods and not the kind Bouvier's Law Dictionary, title Tradeor quality: Upton, pages 26, 98 and 99. Mark; Upton 99, 179.
Collins v. Cowen, 3 Kay & Johnson 428.
If the name has become geaeric and
When words or names are in common denotes the name of aU article, and not
use, the law does not allow them to be an article made by a particular person s
appropriated so as to become the subject there can be no property in it: Singleof property: Newman v. Alvord, 49 tox v.BotUon, 3 Doug. 393; Canhag Y
Barb. 591 ; Burnett v. Phalon, 9 Bosw. Jones, 2 Vesey & Beames 218; Upton
192; Wolfe v. Goulard, 18 How. Pr. 64; on Trade-Marks 24, 25, 110, 116 to
Corwin v. Daly, 7 Bosw. 222; Binninger 122 inclusive. Tomson v. Wiaciaster,
V. Wattles, 28 How. Pr. 206.
19 Pick. 214; Daniel's ChanceryFrac.
A party cannot appropriate as a trade- tice 1754; Edin on Injunctions 226.
mark a sign or symbol, which, from the In Newman Y. Alvord, 49 Barb. 588,
niture of the fact it is intended to repre- the court held there could be property
sent, others may employ with equal in the word "Akron," that being the
truth, and therefore have an equal right name of a village, but they expressly
to employ for the same purpose: Fari- say that if the defendant had been doing
na v. Silrerlock, 6 De G. M & G. business in Akron the case would have
214; Amosk-eag Manufacturing Co. v. been different.
Spear, 2 Sandf. S. C. 607; Perry v.
In words which have a common acTruefitt, 6 Beavan 66 ; .9tridgev. Wells, ceptation, and can be used by one with
13 How. Pr. 385 ; Partridgev. hfMenck, as much propriety as the other, there
2 Barb. Ch. 101; Pidding v. How, 8 can be no property so held as to the
Simons 477; Town v. Stetson, 5 Abb. words Schiedam Schnapps and DessicaPr. N. S. 218.
ted CodbIz: Wolfe v. Goulard,18 How.
John S. Faber and John H. Faber, Pr. 64; Town v. Stetson, 5 Abb. Pr.
both manufactured lead pencils near Nu- X. S. 218.
remberg, Germany. They both marked
The party coming into a court of
their names on pencils made by them. equity to have his trade-mark protected
On the trial of the case it was proved must come with clean bands: Rtridge
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v. Wells, 13 How. Pr. 385; Fitridge mark: Upton 179; Bouvier's Law
Y. Wdls, 4 Abb. Pr. 144; Partridge Dictionary, title Trade-Marks.
The injunction will be denied if grantY. Meick, 2 Sandf. Ch. 622 ; Craft Y.
Day, 7 Beavan 84; Crawthaw v. ing it will create a monopoly: AmosThompson, 4 Man. & Gr. 357 ; Welch v. keag Manufacturing Co. v. Spear, 2
Sandf. S. C. 606 and 607.
Knote, 4 Kay & Johns. 747.
If the deception will not deceive the
When the parties have the right to
make the article, fraud must be shown ordinary mass of purchasers the injuncon the part of the defendants or thd in- tion will be denied : Merrimac Manujunction will be denied: Burgess v. facturing Co. v. Garner, 4 E. D. Smith
Burgess, 17 Eng. Law and Eq. 260; 387; Amoskeag Manufacturing Co. T.
Farina v. Silverlock, 39 Eng. Law and Spear, 2 Sandf. S. C. 607.
On the dissolution of a firm, all the
Eq. 514; Daniel's Chancery Practice
former partners are entitled to use the
1754 and note a..
The party claiming property in the trade-mark of the firm: Coffin v. Bruxtrade-mark said to be violated must be ton, 5 McLean 256.
The protection of the court will not
the first to use it for that purpose:
be given if the party seeking it is not
Upton on Trade-Marks 47.
The defendants will not be decreed to entitled to the exclusive use of the
pay costs if they have not been guilty of trade-mark said to be violated: Upton
fraud: Millington v. Fox, 3 Mylne & 22 and 30 near the bottom.
All the parties in interest must be
Craig 338; 0rawshaw v. Thompson, 4
Man. & Gr. 357; Partridge v. Menck, made parties to the suit: McCall v.
Sisher, 2 Gil. 47 ; Greenleaf v. Queen
1 Howard's Appeal Cases 547 ; Upton
on Trade-Marks 34 to 46 inclusive ; et al., i Pet. 138 ; Van Epps v. Van
Willard's Eq. Jur. 403, note 5; Pal- Deusen, 4 Paige 75 ; Burnhams v. Burnv.
mer v. Harris, 8 American Law Reg. hams, 2 Barb. Ch. 407 ; Shaver
N. S. 137, and authorities cited by Brainard,29 Barb. 25.
Further as to trade-marks see .Filley
SHAnswooD in delivering the opinion
of the court: Partridge v. Menck, 2 v. Fassett, 8 Am. Law Reg. N. S.
Sandf. Ch. 622. He th/t hath committed 402, note and cases cited ; Hostetter v.
iniquity shall not have equity, Francis' Vowinkle, 1 Dillon Cir. Ct. Rep. (in
press).
Maxims 5.
C. W.
Advertising cannot make a trade-

Sureme Court of Errors of Connecticut.
THOMAS S. SELLEW'S APPEAL FROM PROBATE.
A probate decree settling an executor's account is not conclusive evidence of his
liability in money for the balance with which he is charged. That sum represents
a balance of the estate undisposed of remaining for distribution, and the decree
while it stands is conclusive evidence that he had in his hands those items of personal property.
But where a mistake has been made in the settlement of the account, and
property with which the executor is charged proves in fact to have been lost or

SELLEW'S APPEAL.
destroyed when supposed to have been in existence or is subsequently taken from
the executor by a paramount title when it was supposed to belong to the estate,
the equity power of the court of probate is sufficient for the correction of the mistake, which correction may be made upon an application by the executor to the
court for relief.
And where the same person is executor and trustee under a will, and after the
settlement of his account as executor there is a loss of property without his fault,
•
the court of probate may afford him relief in the settlement of his trustee account.
In such a case the trustee ought to charge himself with the whole amount which
the court had ordered to be distributed to him and to credit himself with any loss
or depreciation of the property, and the finding of the court of probate ought expressly or by necessary implication to determine the fact that he is entitled to
those credits.
Where an executor was also a trustee under the same will and by the settlement
of his account as executor was charged with a certain sum, and by a later settlement of his trustee account was charged with a less sum, the difference representing the loss or depreciation of property in his hands, it was held on an appeal
from a probate decree settling the trustee account, that, as the record did not show
precisely what the decree appealed from was, the mere fact of the difference between the two accounts was not a sufficient reason for reversing the decree.
A will gave property to a trustee for the benefit of a daughter of the testator,
the income to be paid to her annually until she should reach the age of twentyfive years, at which time the property was to be conveyed to her absolutely, with
a right on the part of the trustee in his discretion to convey all the property to
her before reaching that age, and with a bequest over to other relatives of the
testator in case the daughter should die without issue before the property was so
conveyed to her. The daughter died without issue before arriving at the age of
twenty-five years. Previous to her death the trustee had delivered to her a small
portion of the trust estate: Held, that the trustee under the provision authorizing
him to convey to her all the property in his discretion before she should reach the
age of twenty-five, had. a right to deliver to her such portion of the property as
he thought best.
Where both parties to a suit move for a new trial or file motions in error, the
party should go forward in the argument whose right it was to go forward in the
court below.

APPEAL from three decrees of a probate court accepting and
settling the account of William W. Wilcox, as trustee under the
will of Anson R. Sellew. The reasons of appeal which were filed
are stated in the opinion of this court.

The Superior Court reversed the decrees of the probate court
appealed from, and both the appellant and the appellee moved for
a new trial for errors in the rulings and decisions of the court,
and also motions in error presenting the same points. The points
made on both sides in these motions are sufficiently stated in the

opinion.
When the case came up for argument in this court a question
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was raised by the counsel as to which party should go forward,
both having moved for a new trial and both having filed motions
in error. The judges decided that the party that went forward
below-the appellant-should go forward here, HINMAN, C. J.,
remarking that if a case stands so that any affirmative at all is
left upon the plaintiff he always goes forward, whatever affirmatives may rest on the defendant.
Dooittle, for the appellant.
Wrrigt, for the appellee.
BUTLER, J.-This is a complicated case as presented upon the
record, both parties filing motions for a new trial, and both motions
in error, but the real questions are few. In order to give reasons
for our decision in the case intelligibly, it seems necessary to
extract the material facts from the record.
Anson R. Sellew died testate, bequeathing his whole property
in trust to his executors, for the benefit of certain relatives.
Only one of the executors, Wilcox, accepted the trusts. The
estate was duly settled, and the balance in the hands of the
executor ascertained. Subsequently the trustee settled his trust
account with the court of probate, upon three several occasions,
and upon each the account was accepted and approved. The
appellants appealed from the three several orders of the court
of probate, accepting and approving the accounts of the trustee,
and in the Superior Court filed their reasons of appeal, assigning
four several errors in the action of that court.
The first error assigned is, that the trustee in presenting his
trust account to the court of probate for settlement did not
charge himself with the whole value of the property found to be
in his hands upon the settlement of his executor's account, but
for a sum $630.98 less than the amount found to be in his hands
upon said settlement.
The second reason is, that the trustee sold a tract of real estate
appraised at $2800, which was a part of said trust estate, and
had not accounted for the proceeds.
The third reason is, that the trustee had paid over, improperly
and without law or right, to Emma A. Sellew, a daughter of the
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deceased, and one of the ce8tUi qui trust, a portion of the trust
estate, to the injury of the appellant as residuary legatee.
The fourth reason is, that under an erroneous construction of a
clause of the will, the trustee wrongfully retained the sum of
$1000 for the use and benefit of"Sarah 0. Sellew, which sum
should have been paid to the appellant as residuary legatee.
These questions, with the clauses of the will which relate to
them, and the facts as found by the court bearing upon them, we
will consider in their order.
The court below, in respect to the first assigned error, found
the settlement and balance in the hands of the executor as
alleged; that the amount credited in his first trustee account was
$680.98 less, as alleged; that the error was propagated through
the three trustee accounts which were settled and approved; and
on that ground reversed the decrees.
Upon this point it appears from the appellee's motion for a new
trial that he offered evidence to show that the $680.98 was not
properly chargeable to him: 1st. Because a portion of the property
his hands; 2d. That there was a depreciation in some of the
charged to him in his executor's account never in fact came to
personal property charged in the inventory of the estate before
it came into his hands as trustee; 3d. That there was a depreciation in some of the personal property between the time when
he settled his administration account and the time when he settled
his trustee account; 4th. That furniture to the value of $141.23,
embraced in the inventory, and charged to him in the executor's
account, was claimed and taken by the widow, and his title thereto
failed. The evidence so offered was rejected by the court, on the
ground that the matter was res adjudicata, and in that we think
the court misapprehended the law.
A decree of a court of probate, settling an executor's or administrator's account, is undoubtedly in the nature of a final
judgment and conclusive of all matters involved in it. But it is
not conclusive upon the executor or administrator of a money
demand or liability, and the rule applicable to a judgment for
a. money demand cannot be applied to it. The executor or administrator as a trustee receives the estate of a deceased person,
administers upon it according to law, and presents an account of
his administration, and it is settled by the court. The balance
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found on such settlement is a balance of the estate undisposed of
remaining for distribution, and if the account has been settled in
an orderly and proper manner the schedules will show with precision the items of property which compose that balance, and the
decree is undoubtedly conclusive evidence that the executor or
administrator has in his hands those items of personal property
for distribution. There may be cases where the entire balance
may consist of cash in the hands of the executor or administrator,
but this case is not of such a character.
But suppose a mistake has been made in the settlement of the
account, and an item of property which was supposed to be in
existence was in fact lost or destroyed, and the fact was unknown
to the executor or the court; must the executor lose it ? Or suppose an item of property which the executor supposed was part
of the estate, and which is charged to him in the administration
account, is subsequently taken from him by paramount title;
must the executor lose that? Certainly not. The equity power
of the court of probate is ample for the correction of such mistakes, and for the protection of the executor.
If the order of distribution has not been made, he may apply
to the court for relief, setting forth the facts, and the court may
find them true upon the record, and make the order of distribution conform. So, at any subsequent stage of the proceedings,
the application may be made and the relief granted.
Where, in a case like this, the entire estate is given to one
person in trust, and where the trustee is a third person, and a part
of the property has been taken from the executor by paramount
title after distribution, the executor can have no relief against the
claim of the trustee except by an application as executor, and an
adjudication by the court of probate, for his protection. But
-where the executor and trustee are the same person, and the
property is claimed and taken by paramount title subsequent to
the settlement of the administration account, or subsequent to
the distribution of the estate, we see no reason why an application should be made to the court of probate for relief by the
trustee as executor, or why relief and protection may not be
afforded him in the settlement of his trustee account.
So, in like manner, if there is a loss of property without fault
on the part of the trustee, or a loss upon the sale of the property,
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or any other occurrence in relation to it after distribution and
before the settlement of his trustee account, we can conceive of
no reason why the court of probate in the settlement of that
account may not afford him all the relief to which he is equitably
entitled, and we do not see how, admitting the conclusiveness of
the administration account upon all the matters upon which that
conclusiveness has any bearing, the court of probate could refuse
to grant him relief.
Such being in our view the principles applicable in this case,
we think it was competent for the court of probate to make an
allowance in the trustee account for the failure of title to the
furniture, or for any loss which had accrued from the sale of
property by the trustee, or any other allowance to which he might
be equitably entitled, and if in fact it did that and no more, and
if the difference of 6630.98 was thus accounted for, the decrees
were not reversible simply because the amount found due in the
settlement of the executor's account and the amount with which
the trustee charged himself in his account did not conform.
The account of the trustee was undoubtedly incorrect in form.
He should have charged himself with the whole amount which the
court had ordered to be distributed to him and credited himself
with any failure of title or loss or depreciation in the property
decreed to be in his hands, and the finding of the court of probate upon the settling of the account should expressly or by
necessary implication have determined the fact that he was entitled to those credits. Perhaps the decree was reversible for that
reason, but there are not sufficient facts upon the record to show
precisely what the decrees appealed from were. If the trustee
was in fact entitled to credits to the amount of $630.98, as an
offset to the balance found to be in his hands on the settlement
of his executor's account, and that appears expressly or by necessary implication to have been found and allowed by the court in
the settlement of the trustee account, the error in respect to form
was not a fatal one.
The Superior Court was acting as an appellate court to determine the correctness of the trustee accounts, and was bound to
give such credits as the probate court should have given, and
received such evidence in relation to them as the probate cQurt
should have received.
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For these reasons we think the Superior Court should have
received the evidence offered by the appellee, and that because
of its rejection a new trial must be granted.
It is not necessary that we should express an opinion upon the
other questions raised, but it is proper under the circumstances
that we should do so in respect to the third reason of appeal

briefy.
The second issue raised by the reasons for appeal does not ap.
pear to have been pursued in the court below, and dops not require
notice.
The issue raised by the third reason for appeal wds decided by
the court below in favor of the appellee, and, we think, correctly.
At the time that the transfer of the property to Emma was made
the previous contingent trust was determined, and the trustee
under the will had power to transfer to her absolutely the whole
or any part of the estate at his discretion. The court has found
no fraud or improper conduct on the part of the trustee, nor anything unreasonable in the exercise of his discretion, and certainly
it is not our province to do it. In the determination of that issue
by the court below there is no error.
In relation to the issue raised by the fourth reason of appeal,
we express no opinion, except to advise the Superior Court,
before a new trial shall be had, to cause Sarah 0. Sellew to be
made a party in the case, that she may have an opportunity to be
heard in relation to her rights.
The foregoing opinion seems to us so
extremely just and reasonable, and so
practical, that we deem it too valuable
a commentary upon the final responsibility of executors and trustees to be
omitted from our collection of leading
cases., although it is not fortified by any
citation of authority; nor indeed could
it have been, without embracing a large
number of citations, siuce no single
case, coming within the range of our
observation, covers anything like the
same number of points. It really
covers, in point of principle, a largo
proportion of the points discussed by us
in the two chapters in the third part of
Wills on the Final Account and Distri-

bution of Personal Estate, pp. 393-416,
421-433. And it affords us pleasure to
be able to find our rules, there adopted,
all confirmed, with the possible qualification that it seems to be intimated in
the principal case, that where the executor is charged, in his final account,
with specific personal property, -which
in point of fact had been lost before
that time, without his fault, he may
have the error corrected in the Probate
Court on petition, and, as might be inferred from the general language used,
without disturbing the former decree.
For it is said by the learned judge that
when the executor is also the trustee of
the property, and receives it as such,
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under the decree charging him with
such specific estate as executor, that
even where some of the property was
not in existence at the time of the decree against the executor, the error may
be corrected in settling the account of
the trustee, and in the language of the
learned judge, "we see no reason why
an application should be made to the
Court of Probate for relief by the trustee or executor, or why relief and protection may not be afforded him in the
settlement of his trustee account."
This is most unquestionably sound as
to all facts occurring after the property
comes into his hands as trustee, and

possibly as to facts first coming to his
knowledge after the former decree, and
affecting the question of title to such estate ; but we should have supposed that
in a case where the property had been
destroyed before the passing of the
former decree, the correction of the
error would involve an alteration of the
former decree, and would require some
formal proceeding by the executor as
such for that purpose. With this explanation the opinion is most unquestionably sound and wise, and the
explanation is important only to preclude all possible misapprehension.
I. F. R.

Court of Appeals of Marfland.
PETER S. REYNOLDS v. THE MUTUAL FIRE INSURANCE CO.
Where the insured in a policy issued by a mutual insurance company is discharged by a bankrupt or insolvent law from all his debts and contracts, and
among them his premium-note, the consideration for the policy fails, and the
company is not liable to make good a subsequent loss.
The receipt by the company of interest upon his premium-note, after the filing
of his petition in bankruptcy, but without actual notice thereof, is not a waiver
of its right to treat the policy as at an end.

ON October 5th 1858, Reynolds obtained insurance against fire
upon certain buildings in Caroline county, in the Mutual Fire
Insurance Company of Cecil County, for $2383, and at the same
time, in consideration thereof, executed and delivered to the company his note, called a premium-note, for $108.89, to be paid "in
whole or in such sums and at such times as the managers of the
said company shall or may call for the same, according to the
provisions of the act of incorporation and by-laws of the said
company, and interest thereon at 6 per cent., to be paid annually
in advance so long as the managers of the said company may find
it necessary to call and receive the same." The record showed
that Reynolds regularly paid the interest on said note, and the
taxes assessed by the company, to August 1862 inclusive; and
that, on December 25th 1860, he applied to the Circuit Court for
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Caroline county for the benefit of the insolvent laws, and was
finally discharged in the month of October 1862 ; and that the
buildings described in the policy were destroyed by fire in February 1863. The company refused to pay the insurance, and Reynolds instituted suit against it in the Circuit Court for Cecil
county, and the judgment being in favor of the company, the
plaintiff below took this appeal.
Henry W. Archer, for appellant.
Alexander Evans and Wf. J. Jones, for appellee.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
GRASON, J.-The consideration given for the policy of insurance was the premium-note of the appellant. Where insurance
companies conduct. their business exclusively upon the mutual
plan, they have to look to the premiam-notes of the insured for
the means of paying losses that may occur, and for this purpose
they assess upon their members, and call in, such sums as may be
necessary. It is therefore essential that the parties giving their
premium-notes shall be under a legal obligation to pay the
amounts of their respective notes in such sums and at such times
as the companies may require and call for the same, in accorddance with their charter and by-laws. If the insured be discharged from their liability to pay, it follows that the insurers
are also released from their obligation to indemnify against loss
by fire; otherwise, there would be no mutuality in the contract
between the parties. Was the appellant released from the legal
obligation of his contract with the appellee by his discharge under
the insolvent laws? The 4th section of the 48th article of the
Code provides that, "if the creditors, endorsers, or sureties shall
fail to make any allegations or propose interrogatories, or if the
same shall be answered satisfactorily, or determined in favor of
the insolvent, the court shall discharge the insolvent from all debts
and contracts made before the filing of his petition, and he shall be
released from all such debts and contracts." The contract of the
appellant with the appellee was entered into before the former
filed his petition for the benefit of the insolvent laws, and his discharge operated as a release from all liability upon his note to
the appellee; and had any necessity arisen for calling in sums
from parties insured for the purpose of paying losses incurred by
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fire, the appellant could have successfully resisted any such call
upon him by pleading his discharge under the insolvent laws.
After his discharge there remained no mutuality in the contract
between him and the appellee, and he cannot- be permitted to hold
it bound by its contract, while he himself has been released from
all liability upon his note, which is the only consideration on which
the policy was issued. He is therefore not entitled to recover
from the appellee for the loss he has sustained by the destruction
of his buildings by fire, even if it appeared from the record that
he had an insurable interest therein at the time of the fire.
But it was contended that by reason of the receipt, by the appellee
from the appellant, of interest upon the premium-note after the filing of the petition for the benefit of the insolvent laws, it has waived
any right it may have had to treat the policy of insurance as at an
end and no longer binding upon it, and is estop]ed from now
denying its continuing validity. This argument is based upon the
fact that the proceedings in insolvency were had in a court of
record, whose proceedings are constructive notice to the whole
world, and that having received the interest on the appellant's
note with this constructive notice of his application" for the insolvent laws, the appellee cannot now avail itself of said application
as a defence to this action. If the proof had shown that the appellee had received the payment of interest with actual knowledge
of the appellant's application for the benefit of the insolvent laws,
there might have been some reason for the argument that it had
thereby waived its right to hold itself absolved from its contract,
but upon that question we do not mean to express any opinion.
But the proof clearly shows that the proceedings in insolvency
were had in a court at some distance from the county in which the
office of the appellee was located and its officers resided, and that
they had no actual notice of those proceedings and the discharge
of the appellant, until long after the month of August 1862,
when he made his last payment of' interest. The principle is well
settled that a party will not be held to have waived his rights or
to be estopped by his conduct and acts, unless it is shown that he
has acted with full knowledge of all the facts affecting his rights:
ijams v. Hoffman, 1 Md. 437, 438; Gray v. Murray, 8 John.
Oh. Reps. 188; Bennett v. Colley, 2 Myl. & Keene 225; Howard v. Carpenter, 11 Md. 279; Flagg v. Mann, 2 Sumner 563.
We find no error in the rulings of the court belo ff.
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The evidence in the second exception, which was objected to by
appellant and admitted by the court, was legally admissible.
Proof having been offered to show that Alexander Stewart was
agent of the appellee, residing in Caroline county, the evidence
objected to was admissible to show the special character and extent
of the agency. The judgment appealed from must be affirmed.

United States Circuit Court. Southtern District of Georgia.
WILLIAM N. MARSH XT AL. v. WILLIAM H. BURROUGHS

ET

AL.

A bank incorporated by the state of Georgia in 1854 having become insolvent,
suit was brought by a holder of its notes and judgment recovered at law. The
creditor then filed a bill against some of the stockholders for the unpaid balance
of their subscriptions. The stockholders set up in defence that the notes on which
the judgment was founded were issued by the bank directors to the Confederate
States and in aid of the rebellion, and were therefore void under the Constitution
of Georgia of 1868, which nullifies all contracts made during the war and in aid
thereof, and all notes or. other evidences of such contracts. Held, that if such
defence existed it should have been made to the action at law, and the court of
equity could not now go behind the judgment.
But even if such defence were still open, the Constitution of Georgia could not
impair the obligation of contracts existing at its adoption.
The fact that the Constitution of 1868 was revised. by Congress and certain conditions imposed, before the admission of the state to representation, did not give
such Constitution the force of an Act of Congress.
Whatever may have been the precise status of Georgia after the war, the adoption of the Constitution of 1868 has been recognised by the political department
of the Federal Government as the act of the people of Georgia, and it must'therefore be so regarded by the courts.
A judgment-creditor who has exhausted his remedy at law, may file a bill
against persons holding property of his debtor which cannot be reached by execution, and he need not join other creditors as complainants.
If in such case it appears by the pleadings or otherwise that distribution must
be made pro rata among a certain class, the court will frame its decree for the
benefit of all.
So a judgment-creditor may pursue any equitable interest of his debtor in whosever hands it may be without making third persons parties, although the party
sued may be entitled to contribution or indemnity from such third persons.
Subscriptions to capital stock of a corporation, wholly or partly unpaid, are
assets, even though never called in by the corporate authority, and may be made
available by creditors for the payment of their debts.

Tuis was a bill filed by certain note-holders of the Merchants'
and Planters' Bank of Savannah, who had obtaincd judgments
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against the bank for the amount of notes held by them, against
certain stockholders of the bank, who had not paid in full their
subscriptions of stock, seeking a decree against the defendants to
the amount of their unpaid subscriptions, for the payment of the
said judgment.
The bank was chartered by an Act of Georgia, February 13th
1854, by which certain persons therein named, their associates
and successors, were incorporated by the name of the Merchants'
and Planters' Bank, to be located at Savannah, with the usual
powers given to such institutions. By the second section of the
charter it was declared that the capital of the bank should be two
millions of dollars, to be divided into twenty thousand shares, of
one hundred dollars each, and that so soon as ten per cent. of
said capital was subscribed and paid in in specie, or specie funds,
it should be the duty of the commissioners named in the act to
call a meeting and organize the bank by the election of directors.
The directors were empowered to appoint a president and other
officers. By the seventh section the president and directors,
after the first instalment on subscriptions to the amount of two
hundred thousand dollars had been paid in, were empowered to
call in further instalments of not over twenty per cent. at any
one time, by giving at least sixty days' notice of said call. On
failure to pay up a call the shares might be forfeited.
By the 15th section, it was declared that the persons and
property of the stockholders should at all times be liable, pledged
and bound for the redemption of bills and notes at any time
issued, in proportion to the number of shares that each individual
and corporation might hold and possess.
The bill alleged that the capital stock of the bank was all duly
subscribed and the bank duly organized shortly after its incorporation, and that it went into operation, issued notes, received
deposits, and carried on a general banking business; that the
complainants severally became lawful owners and holders of the
notes of the bank, which were presented to the president and cashier
in March, 1867, and were not paid, that thereupon the complainants
separately instituted actions at law on their notes against the bank,
and on the 25th of November 1867, recovered judgments, and that
executions were issued on all the judgments and returned "nulla
bona" on the 23d of May 1868.
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The bill alleged that .the bank had become insolvent, and had
assigned its assets to Hiram Roberts, tlie president, in trust for
the benefit of its creditors; but that the assets assigned would not
pay more than ten cents on a dollar of its indebtedness, which
amounted to a million of dollars or thereabouts. As an excuse
for not joining other complainants, the bill alleged that the circulation of the bank was held in every State of the Union by
innumerable unknown persons; and as an excuse for not making
all the stockholders defendants, it alleged that there were 20,000
shares of stock held by a great number of stockholders residing
indifferent states-some insolvent, some dead, etc.
The bill then alleged that the defendants Iere stockholders,
and stated the number of shares held bj each, and the amount
paid thereon, and the amount still unpaid, and claimed that the unpaid stock was a trust fund applicable to the payment of the debts of
the bank, inasmuch as the debts could not be paid by the assets.
The bill prayed that this might be so decreed, and that the
defendants might be required to pay to the complainants, or into
Court, or in some other manner, the several amounts so in their
hands respectively, and that the same might be applied to the
payment and satisfaction of the notes held by the complainants.
By an amended bill, they alleged that they purchased the notes
prior to January 1st, 1867, in a fair course of trade, for a
valuable consideration, and without any notice that they had
been used in aid of the rebellion or for any other illegal purpose.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
BRADLEY, J.-The principal facts stated in the bill are not
disputed. The defendants by their answer and in argument set
up various grounds of defence, which I will proceed to examine:
1. It is objected that the bill is defective for want of parties,
both complainant and defendant; that it should have been filed
by, or in behalf of, all the creditors, because all are interested in
the funds-and against all the stockholders, because all are bound
to contribute pro rata. As to the complainants, it has long been

settled that a judgment-creditor who has exhausted his legal
remedy, by execution returned "1nu~la bona," may, alone, or
with other judgment-creditors, file a bill against persons holding
property of the debtor, which, on account of fraud, or the existence of a trust, cannot be reached by execution: 2 Kent's Com.
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583 [443] and notes; .lefDermott et al. v. Strong, 4 Johns. Ch.
Rep. 687; .Hadden v. iSpader, 5 Id. 280; s. c. 20 Johns. 554;
Lentilhon, v. Afoffatt, 1 Edw. Oh. Rep. 451; .Di v. Briggs, 9
Paige 595; Storm v. Taddell, 2 Sandf. Oh. R. 494; Tappan v.
Evans, 1 N. H. 311; Ogilvie v. Knox Ins. Co., 22 How. 880;
Kleinschmidt et al. v. .Dunphy et al., 11 Wall 692i
Where a case exists in which a fund can only be divided satisfactorily amongst a certain class of persons, it is necessary to
frame the decree in such a manner as that all those persons may
be brought in for their distributive shares; but even then, the
bill may often be filed by any one of them on his own behalf.
It is only when it appears to the court by the subsequent pleadings, or otherwise, that a distribution must be made (as where an
executor pleads want of sufficient assets), that a decree will be
made for the benefit of all.' In this case, what law compels an
equal distribution of the fund sought to be reached amongst all
the creditors ? The assets in the hands of the assignee are sub .jected to such a law, because they have been granted to him in,
trust for all creditors equally. But it is conceded that the unpaid
capital stock is not subject to the assignment. If subjected to
the demands of the complainants, as judgment-creditors, it will
be exonerated, pro tanto, from all further demands.
As to the nonjoinder of necessary defendants, the same authorities above quoted may be cited. A judgment-creditor who has.
exhausted his legal remedy, may pursue, in a court of equity,
any equitable interest, trust, or demand of his debtor, in whosesoever hands it may be. And if the party thus reached has a
remedy over against other parties for contribution or indemnity,
it will be no defence to the primary suit against him that they
are not parties. If a creditor were to be stayed until all such
parties could be made to contribute their proportionate shares of
the liability, he might never get his money.
2. It is contended that the unpaid subscriptions of capital stock
are not assets for the payment of debts, either legal or equitable:
that they exist merely as possibilities; that they are not a debt
due, having never been called in; that no one can call them in
but the directors, and in them it is a mere discretionary power,
which cannot be exercised, either by the assignee, the. receiver,.
or the court itself, and cannot be assigned; that said unpaid subscriptions are no part of the capital stock of the bank ; and that
VOL. XIX.-46
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the real capital stock is what has been called in, namely, $535,000,
and not $2,000,000.
This position may be somewhat plausible, but it is not sound.
It is not a mere power vested in the bank to make further calls.
It is a right; and where a debtor has such a right and does not
choose to exercise it, equity, at the instance of creditors, will
exercise it for him. When a stockholder subscribes stock, and
his subscription is accepted, it is not only the right of the bank
to call in the money, but it is the right of the stockholder to pay
it. The mode of calling it in, prescribed by the charter, is a
mere form of remedy given to the bank to enforce the subscription, usually followed by forfeiture for non-payment, if the bank
so choose. But the stockholder is not obliged to wait until a call
is made upon him. He may pay in at any time; and if the business of the bank were very profitable, no doubt he would avail
himself of the opportunity. Such a right cannot be described as
a .mere power on the part of the bank, to be exercised or not, as
it chooses, and dependent for its existence on the personal discretion of the directors.
The same objections were made in the case of The Planters'
and Mechanics' Bank of Columbus, and were overruled by the
Supreme Court of this state in Hightower v. Thornton et al., 8
Ga. 486, and it was there held that unpaid subscriptions to the
capital stock of a company are corporate property, constituting a
trust-fund, which can be reached by the creditors in a court of
equity; and that the amount subscribed, and not the sums actually
paid in, is the capital stock of a company. As to the position
that the equity of a creditor is a mere right to sue, and is not
therefore assignable, and could not be assigned to complainants,
it is sufficient to say that the equity is attendant upon the legal
right vested in the holder of the bills as such. It goes with that
as an incident, and does not belong to that class of mere rights
of action which become separated from the thing out of which
they grew and attach to the person only-as the right to sue for
a trespass committed, and the like.
S. The next point made is, that if the unpaid subscriptions are
indeed assets for the payment of debts, then they have been
assigned, and are in the receiver's hands, and must be collected
;and administered by him, for the equal benefit of all the creditors
amder the trust of the assignment.
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But an examination of the assignment will show that it does.
not assume to convey these subscriptions; but, on the contrary,
specifically assigns those things which are set out in a schedule
annexed to the assignment, and does not contain any general
words sufficiently compreheifaive to cover stock subscriptions.
And as the assignment is a common-law instrument, deriving no
extraneous efficacy from the statute law of Georgia, except the
general statute which gives assignability to bonds, specialties,
and other contracts in writing for the payment of money, or any
article of property, judgments, and executions (Code of Georgia,
§ 2734), it cannot be construed to reach the claims in question.
Besides, the attitude of the bank, its directors and stockholders,
from the first, has been inconsistent with the idea that these unpaid subscriptions were embraced in the assignment. It is just
1
what they always have opposed and denied.
is,
defendants
by
the
4. Another point quite strenuously urged
that the notes held by the complainants were issued directly to the
Confederate States Government, and to the state of Georgia, during the rebellion, and in aid thereof. The answers severally allege
this fact, and the only evidence offered by complainants to rebut
it, is proof that they purchased the notes in open market, in regular course, for value paid, without any notice or suspicion that
they were issued for any illegal purpose. The defendants, therefore, rely on the Article V., § XVI., subdivision I. of the Constitution of 1868, which not only nullifies all contracts made
during the rebellion, in aid thereof, but all bonds, deeds, promissory notes, bills, or other evidences of debt, made in connection
with such contracts, or as the consideration therefor, or in furtherance thereof; and declares that when the defendant will make
a plea, supported by his affidavit, that he has good reason to
believe that the obligation or evidence of the indebtedness on
which the suit is predicated, or some part thereof, has been given
or used for the illegal purpose aforesaid, the burden of proof shall
be upon the plaintiff to satisfy the court and jury that it is not
founded upon, or in *any way connected with, any such illegal
contract, and has not been used in aid of the rebellion; and the
date of the bill, &c., shall not be evidence that it has or has not,
since its date, been issued, transferred, or used in aid of the
rebellion.
Now, in reforence to this point, it is to be observed that it does
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not fairly arise in the case. The bill is founded on certain judgments and executions in favor of the complainants, which were
recovered in 1867. Had any such defence, as is indicated by the
answers, existed, it should have been made to the actions at law;
for, although the constitution did not then exist, yet it would
have been a good defence to have shown that the notes were issued
in aid of the rebellion, and that the plaintiffs knew it, or had

reason to know it. Not being set up then, it cannot be set up
now. The stockholders of the bank cannot ask to go behind the
judgments rendered against the bank and question the original
cause of action, unless they can show collusion between the plain-

tiffs and the bank, entered into for the purpose of defrauding the
stockholders.
But even if the question were open, I could not yield to the
force of the defendants' argument. They contend that the Constitution of 1868 has all the force and effect of an Act of Congress,
and, therefore, is not obnoxious to that clause of the Constitution

of the United States which declares that no state shall pass any
law impairing the obligation of a contract; that the Constitution
of 1868 has the force and effect of an Act of Congress, they in

sist, because it was adopted under the Reconstruction Acts, under
military supervision, and not by the free consent and express will
of the people of Georgia, and because, after its adoption by the
convention, it was revised by Congress and certain parts were
struck out--or, at least, Congress made it a condition of 'admission that they should be struck out-and that the legislature
should ratify the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of
the United States [see Act of June 25th 1868, 15 Stat. at Large,
p. 73]; and that this was, in effect, an approval and adoption by

Congress of the parts not excepted to.
I cannot concur in this view What was the precise status of
Georgia after the war, and before its readmission into the Union,

with all the normal relations of a state, will, perhaps, never be
defined to the satisfaction of all.

But that some sort of rehabili-

tation was necessary, in order that Georgia might *occupyher old
position in the Union-that the adoption of a new constitution
was one of the necessary things to be done, and that an act of the
National authority, admitting Georgia to the representation and
statu of a state in harmonious relations with the Union, was also
a necessary thing to be done--seem to be propositions that can
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hardly admit of a doubt. This conceded, how can it be said that
the adoption of the Constitution of 1868 was not the act of the
people of Georgia? The courts cannot do otherwise than regard
ji as such. This is a political question in which the courts must
follow the action of the political department of the government.
To'adopt any other course would be to introduce the greatest confusion. Congress, as was its right, regulated the elective franchise. There was no other legal authority to do it. The executive
had no such authority. The state government of Georgia was a
mere provisional one, and could not legally do it. No interference with the freedom of elections was interposed; on the contrary, the General Government took measures to prevent any such
interference. All that Congress had to do, in relation to the
constitution, when the state applied for readmission, was to impose certain conditions, to wit: That certain unwise clauses should
be left out of the constitution, and that the legislature should
ratify the Fourteenth Amendment. This was done. But Georgia was not compelled to do it. She could do as she pleased.' It
was at her own option. How can this possibly make the constitution an Act of Congress, or tantamount to such an act ?
Then, is a provision in a state constitution, which impairs the
obligation of a contract, void? I have no doubt on the subject.
A state can no more pass a law violating a contract by means of a
convention, than it can by means of a legislature; and a constitution adopted by a state, either after its admission, or with a
view to its admission or readmission into the Union, must be
regarded as a law of the state, and amenable to the prohibitory
clauses of the Constitution.
Then, looking at the Constitution of 1868. Does the clause
relied on impair the obligation of a contract ? The first part of
the clause, which declares void all contracts made in aid of the
rebellion, only expresses what would be the law, without any
declaration on the subject. The second part, which avoids the
instruments in whosesoever hands they may come, when applied to
such instruments as bank notes, is more questionable. But the final
portion, which throws the burden of proof on the plaintiff to show
that the notes have never been used in aid of the rebellion, if only
the defendant will swear that he has reason to believe that they
were so used, imposes upon the plaintiff an impossibility, and is
tantamount to destroying the contract on the simple oath of the
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defendant, as to his belief. I cannot think that such a provision
is constitutional.
5. But the defendants make still another point, namely, that
they have severally redeemed their shares of the notes of the bank,
and have them ready to show as offsets to their liability as stockholders. This part of the answer relates only to the personal
liability of all stockholders for the debts of the bank, under the
*fifteenth section of the charter, and not to their liability for unpaid subscriptions to stock. But, supposing the answer was right
in form, could the defendants set up this defence to the bill ?
They do not show how they procured the notes. They have not
recovered judgment on them. They may be unable to do so. The
notes they hold may be open to the very objections they raise
against the notes held by the complainants. They would not be
permitted to pay up their subscriptions, if called on by the bank,
in its old, depreciated currency. The most they can do with these
notes, it seems to me, is to present them to the receiver for their
prb rata share of the assets of the bank; or, if they can recover
judgment on them, to pursue the course which has been pursued
by the complainants, if it is competent for them to sue other
stockholders when they themselves are owing the bank.
For these reasons, I think a decree must be made in favor of
the complainants, the form of which, on reflection, I think should
be that the defendants should severally pay to the complainants
the amounts due by them for unpaid stock, so far as may be
necessary to satisfy the amount of the complainants' judgments,
interest, and costs. It was suggested that those who had paid
the least percentage on their stock should be first called upon,
but I think all are equally liable to pay what they have not paid
on their subscriptions; and, although the directors might be
required to pursue that order, I dd not think the court is bound
to follow the directions marked out for the directors. It was also
suggested that the decree should be based on a settlement and
distribution of the fund in the hands of the receiver, and should
make the defendants liable only for such balance as might be due
to the complainants after receiving their share of that fund; but:
this would postpone the complainants indefinitely, and it seems to
be generally conceded that the assets in the receiver's hands are
not sufficient to pay the other creditors.
Decree for the complainants.

RICHARDS v. MILLER.

Circuit Court of Adams County, Illinois.
ELIZABETH RICHARDS v. JOHN N. MILLER.
Where a testatrix upon making certain specific bequests, gave the remainder
of her estate to her heirs at law, Add, that notwithstanding the executor had sold
the land devised and converted it into money, the surplus remaining after the payment of debts and legacies should, for the purpose of distribution, be treated as
land, and go to the heirs, and not the next of kin to the testatrix.
Held, also, that the remainder should be disposed of precisely as if no will had
been made.
The word "heir" in a will, when used in connection with real estate, is to be
strictly construed, unless it clearly appears from the instrument that a different
meaning was intended. The heirs of a person are those upon whom the estate
vests by operation of law, and the husband, in respect to the real estate of his wife
dying without children, is included in that decription, and the fact that she gives
him a pecuniary legacy does not necessarily exclude his right of heirship in any
remainder undisposed of by the will.
APPEAL

from the County Court of Adams county.

Hon. 0. W. Browning and A. B. Wheat, for the plaintiff.

A. Wheat and T. V. 3torey, for the defendant.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
SIBLEY, J.-In July 1868, Frances Miller died, leaving a last
will, containing various pecuniary legacies, one of which was to
her husband, and then the following clause:-" Ninth. I give,
devise, and bequeath to my heirs at law the remainder of my
estate."
The estate of the deceased consisted chiefly of a farm, containing about 110 acres, upon which she was residing with her husband at the time of her death. The personal property and money
left by her, after paying the funeral expenses and debts, amounted
to a few hundred dollars, but not enough to pay off the pecuniary
legacies in the will, and the executor obtained an order of the
County Court to sell the land for that purpose.
Under this order, the executor sold the entire estate, and, after
paying the costs and legacies, had left for distribution among the
heirs at law, according to the terms of the last clause in the will,
between four and five thousand dollars.
Mrs. 3iller left no lineal descendants to inherit, and her surviving husband therefore claims as heir at law, under the pro-
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visions of the statute, one-half of this surplus now in the hands
of. the executor for distribution.
The 47th section of the revised laws of 1845 provides that
"when any feme covert shall die intestate, leaving no child or
children, or descendants of a child or children, then the one-half
-of the real estat6 of the decedent shall descend and go to her
husband as his exclusive estate for ever."
The probate court on a final settlement with the executor,
directed that he should pay to John N. Miller, the husband of the
testatrix, one-half of the money remaining in his hands for distribution, and the other half to the brothers and sisters, or next
of kin to the decedent.
From this decree Elizabeth Richards, a sister of the testatrix,
has appealed to this court to reverse that order, and has assigned,
for reasons of reversal, that it was erroneous to permit the husband to share in this fund: 1st. Because the testatrix in using
the words "heirs at law" meant children or next of kin; and, 2d.
That the husband cannot be considered an heir of the testatrix,
for the reason the statute creates him such in cases only where the
wife dies intestate; and the disposition of her estate by the testatrix in this case destroyed his right of heirship.
The first position assumed by the eminent counsel for the plaintiff-that the court should construe the will according to the real
intention of the testatrix, and in so doing, disregard the use of
technical phrases where their effect would be to vary the manifest
intent of the testatrix-is not controverted. There is perhaps
no rule more inflexible than the one that requires the court, in
construing particular clauses in a will, to look into the whole
instrument, and the circumstances that attended its execution, in
order to ascertain, as far as possible, the design sought to be
accomplished.
This doctrine is so well settled, that any reference to authority
in support of it was quite unnecessary.
In combating an assumption of the defendant that the words
"heirs at law" in the will must receive a strict technical construction, as in Sheltey's Case, the counsel have referred to several
cases where the courts arrived at an opposite conclusion.. The
case in Ambler 273 was a bequest to the testatrix's sister
Loveday's heirs of X6000, and to her sister Brady's children,
equally, £1000. One of the children of Mrs. Loveday having
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died previous to the testatrix, the question arose whether the word
ieirs was intended to include the descendants of the deceased
child, the same as if it had survived the testatrix. It was held
by the Master of the Rolls that the will meant to give the 16000
to the children of Loveday in the same manner as it was given to
the children of Brady, and not to their descendants.
In Bonld'8 Appeal, 31 Conn. 183, where the testator devised
his real estate to his wife for life, with remainder over to his children and their heirs respectively, to be divided in equal shares
between them, it was held that the testator intended the remainder to go to his children living at his death, and to the children
of such as had previously died leaving issue, and not to the collateral heirs of one who left no lineal descendants. But it is
obvious that the word heirs was construed to mean children in
these cases, owing to the particular phraseology of the wills in
them. And if it is intended to make any application of those
cases to the one under consideration, we look into the will in vain
for any intimation pointing to such an interpretation. If children
were meant instead of heirs, whose children are referred to ?
Surely not the testatrix's, for she had none. Nor are those of any
other person even alluded to in the will.
In 2 Burrows 1100, where the words "heirs of the body" were
not technically construed, on account of pther words appearing
wholly inconsistent with them, as "share and share alike," was,
as many other of the cases referred to, a bequest of personal
property only.
Whether the word "heirs" in a will should be construed to
mean next of kin, was a question of considerable controversy in
the early English cases, and very much learning was exhausted
in the'discussion of it.
But the doctrine seems now to be settled in that country (and
in this, wherever the question has arisen), that if it relates to a
bequest of personal estate merely, the word heirs is to be construed to mean next of kin. This construction has, however,
never been extended to cases of devises of real estate. The proposition, as stated, is understood not to be controverted by the
counsel for the heirs at law, and therefore any notice of the
numerous authorities read to establish it, is obviated. Indeed,
the distinction in this case is rendered unimportant, since the
statute does not constitute the husband an heir, or entitle him to
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any portion of his deceased wife's personal estate, and it has never
been supposed that he should be regarded as next of kin to her.
Therefore it cannot be denied that if the surplus now remaining in the hands of the executor is to be treated as personalty in
distributing it, Miller, the husband, will not be entitled to any share.
The question then recurs, Whether the surplus remaining for
distribution is to be regarded as personalty, or realty? As the
farm left by the testatrix was the most valuable part of her estate,
and the personal assets insufficient to pay the debts and legacies,
a resort to the land became imperative in order to discharge them.
These legacies, it is asserted by counsel for the next of kin, and
not denied; became proper charges upon the land. But it may
be added with the qualification that the personal estate should be
first exhausted for their payment. For if the personal assets were
ample to satisfy the legacies, no charge upon the land to pay them
can be implied.
The statute does not contemplate a sale to pay debts and legacies where the personal property is sufficient to discharge them.
And, independent of the statute, the general principle that the
personal effects are primarily liable for that purpose, is too clearly
established to need authority to prove it.
The will conferred upon the executor no express power to
execute the charge by disposing of the land, hence his application to the County Court for leave to sell it, in order to effectuate
the purpose.
The statute, however, authorized the court to order enough of
it only to be sold to attain that object, except in cases when the
property is so situated that a part of it cannot be sold without
manifest prejudice to the owner. Then a sale of the whole may
be ordered. The concluding words of the section are that "the
overplus arising from such sale shall be distributed among the
heirs and devisees, owners, or such other persons as may be entitled thereto."
The executor sold the whole estate; and it is to be presumed
that the proof before the court ordering the sale was such as to
justify his action.
Now, is the overplus remaining in his hands to be treated, for
the purpose of distribution, as personal or real estate ? In other
words, has the executor, by the sale, changed the quality of the
property, or the rights of the parties as to so much of the land
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as was not required to discharge the claims against the estate of
the testatrix? The argument of the counsel for the next of kin
is to that effect, but his authorities do not sustain him.
The case of Craig v. Leslie, 3 Wheat. 563, referred to, grew
out of the will of Robert Craig, who devised his estate to his
executors in trust to sell and pay the proceeds to his brother,
Thomas Craig, an alien, residing in Scotland, and the court
decided that the testator had by the will converted the land into
money, therefore it did not escheat to the state of Virginia, because of the alienage of the heir-at-law, but went to the legatee
as personal property.
In Scudder, .Kxr., v. lVanarsdale, 2 Beas. 109, the will directed
the executors to sell the whole estate and convert it into money,
and, after the payment of debts and legacies, the remainder to
be divided equally among the heirs of the testatrix. The court
held that it appeared from the language of the will that the testatrix had, by blending her entire estate into a common fund,
intended, not only to convert into personalty, but also to have it.
so treated after its conversion, for the purpose of distribution.
These are unlike the present case, where no direction to convert
appears, and much less an intent indicated that when converted
it should be treated as personal property for all purposes.
It is said that an intention to convert may be inferred from the
fact that the testatrix knew her personal effects and money were
not sufficient to pay the legacies, and that the result which she
foresaw would surely happen in executing the provisions of the
will must necessarily have been intended. Might it not with
equal propriety be supposed that she meant to allow her heirs at
law, if they preferred, to pay the legacies themselves, and prevent
the farm from being sold at all? She, of course, knew the law
would give them the right of so doing; and, in the absence of any
expressed desire upon the subject, the most natural conclusion would
be that she did not intend to do anything to deprive them of the
right of election. But if a conversion could be implied necessary
to effectuate the objects of the will, it would be doing great
violence to language to infer also an intention to convert the
remainder after the object had been accomplished, and have that
remainder treated as personal property.
It is not even enough, to say that the testatrix had in view a
state of things which might, if consummated, have led to the dis-
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placement of the heir. The law has cast the descent upon him,
and he cannot be excluded from it, unless the express words of the
wi or a clear intention is manifested by the testatrix to change
its operation. There is nothing in the language of this will to
justify the inference, that the testatrix meant to convert the
remainder of her estate after paying the debts and legacies, into
personalty, and also intended that it should be then treated as
such for all purposes. Without this, the authorities hold that the
quality of the property remains unchanged.
Judge REDFIELD states the rule to be, "in trusts for the sale
of real estate, the surplus not expended- will result to the heir,
and not to the executor or next of kin, according to the nature
of the property from which the money arose. And when real and
personal estate are blended into a common fund, the surplus in
like manner will result to the heir or next of kin as it can be
traced to real or personal estate for its origin." Redfield on
Wills, vol. 3, p. 511. In Ackroyd v. Smithson, 1 Bro. C. C. 128,
which has generally been considered a leading case on the subject, it was decided upon full argument before Lord THUBLOW,
that a surplus remaining in the hands! of the exectutor on a sale
of lands where the intention of the testator did not appear to treat
it as converted to personalty in the direction it would take on
account of certain lapsed legacies, should go to the heir at law.
The same doctrine is asserted in Robinson v. Taylor, 2 Bro. C. C.
589 ; Berry v. lrsker, 11Ves. 87; Wilson v. Major, Id. 20 ; Smith
v. Claxton, 4 Madd. 484; and in Currie v. Buxley, 3 P. Wms. 22,
Mr. Cox, in a note, has collected the authorities relating to the
question. The principle deducible from all of them is, that where
a sale of real estate is made or becomes necessary to execute the
trust, and any thing remains after the completion of the object
for which it was created, the first heir, and not the next of kin is
entitled to the surplus. And where a sale of land is directed by
the will to pay debts and legacies, there must appear not only an
intention on the part of the testator to convert so much of the
proceeds absolutely intopersonal property, as is requisite to pay
the debts and legacies, but also an intent to convert the surplus,
if any remains, and have it so treated for the purpose of distribution, before the heir can be deprived of his right to inherit it. In
the case of Craigv. Leslie, 3 Wheat. 563, referred to by the counsel
for the plaintiff, the court assented to most of the conclusions
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arrived at by the House of Lords in 1?oper v. Badcliff, 9 Mod.
167. One of which was that the heir at law had a resulting trust
in an estate devised to pay debts and legacies, by which he could
enjoin a sale of any more than enough for that purpose, or he
could pay off the debts and compel a conveyance.
The court also remark, that "this doctrine proceeds upon a
principle which is incontrovertible. Where the testator merely
directs the real estate to be converted into money for the purposes directed in the will, so much of the estate, or the money
arising from it, as is not effectually disposed of by the will (whether
it arises from some omission or defect in the will itself, or from
any subsequent accident which prevents the devise from taking
effect) results to the heir at law as the old use not disposed of."
In considering this question, the particular phraseology of the
statute in relation to it, ought not to be put entirely out of view.
It declares that the surplus upon a sale like the one made by the
executor in this case, shall go to the heir, devisee, or owner; words
that much more properly apply to the inheritor of real estate,
than to the next of kin, or distributee of mere personal assets.
If then, as the authorities evidently determine, this fund now
in the hands of the executor for distribution, is to be treated as
real estate, can the position assumed by the learned counsel for
the defence, that the word heirs, when used in a will, must (if
nothing appears to qualify or change its effect) receive such a
technical construction as is said in Redfield on Wills, vol. 2, p. 56,
is now universally given to it, be maintained.
It is quite probable that the rule in Shelley's case, has no direct
application to the particular state of facts which this will discloses.
For the substance of the rule established in that case is, when
lands are, by deed, or other instrument, transferred to another
for life, with remainder over to his heirs, or the heirs of his body,
these" latter words will be construed as words of limitation, and
not words of purchase. Consequently the first taker gets an
estate in fee-simple, or fee-tail, instead of a mere life interest,
with which an opposite construction would have invested him.
The reasons given for this arbitrary rule of construction, are
that by the feudal tenure estates descended to the heir, under the
ordinary rule of inheritance charged with certain rights of marriage and wardshil pertaining to the lord of the fee, of which he
would be defrauded, if the heir was permitted to take the estate
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as purchaser. Should the heir be allowed to take the estate by
purchase, the ancestor might enjoy the property during his life,
'when it would descend to the heir with all the advantages of
hereditary succession, disencumbered of these burdens.
Besides, the inheritance would continue in abeyance during the
existence of the remainder, 'which was contrary to the policy of
the law. And also by limiting the operation of the words that
created the remainder so as to place the whole fee in the ancestor,
it clothed him with the right of alienation. Thus by putting the
estate in the market a generation sooner, commerce was favorably
affected. But before any correct application of that rule is to be
made, there must necessarily have been created an intermediate
estate to which the word heirs can be limited.
The proposition assumed, however, that the word heirs, when
it occurs in a will respecting real estate, is to receive a strict
technical construction, unless it appears from the whole instrument, the testator used it with a different intent, has become a
maxim of the law too fixed to admit of much controversy.
Yet in this case, if the husband is to be treated as heir at law
of his deceased wife, it is wholly immaterial whether he takes by
descent in the sense that term was anciently used, or in the character of a purchaser.
The will of Mrs. Miller, applying to it the rules already
considered, means that the money on hand and personal assets
should be first applied to pay her funeral expenses and debts, and
then to discharge the pecuniary legacies, and if insufficient for the
purpose, enough of the land should be sold to accomplish the
object. After which if any thing remained it was to go to her
heirs at law.
That remainder, although converted into money by the executor,
is, as we have seen, in its character of realty to be distributed
among those heirs according to the statutory rules of descent.
In determining who these heirs are, we are brought to the consideration of the second reason assigned for reversing the order of
the County Court. That is, the husband does not become heir to
the estate of his deceased wife, except in cases where she dies intestate, and there being a will in this case, disposing of all her
property, therefore, the right of the husband to inherit, does not
exist. Some of the points most relied upon by counsel will
be noticed. It is agreed that the husband is heir sub vzodo only.
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That several things must concur before he can inherit, such as
marriage, death without issue, and intestacy of the wife. This
reasoning would apply with equal force to preclude the inheritance
of child from parent.
A marriage must have occurred-an estate to inherit, and an
absence of testamentary disposition of it proven, before any right
to inherit exists. And these collateral heirs are in no better
position in that regard. The argument is faulty in assuming a
fact as premises, which is by no means admitted to exist. That
is, a testamentary disposition of the remainder of the estate after
the payment of debts and legacies, different from what the law
appoints.
This, no doubt, is what the statute means by intestacy. For
when a person disposes of his estate precisely as the law directs
it, those who inherit, take by force of the law, and not by virtue
of the will. Since the former is held to be the supericr title: 4
Kent 506; M-y's Appeal, 50 Penn. 311.
So in -Ellis v. Page, 7"Cush. 161, certain lots were devised to
trustees to sell and pay the proceeds to the testator's son, and
after the son's death, to his children; in case the son died without children, then to his heirs at law. Held, the son dying without issue, that the estate went to the heirs by descent, as if no
will had been made. Smith v. ffarrington, 4 Allen 566, was a
case where the testator, after bequeathing sundry specific legacies,
directed that the balance of his estate should be sold and converted into money, and deposited in bank for the relief of his
heirs when needed. The court decreed that the residue should be
paid over to the several legatees in the same proportion they
would be entitled if the deceased had died intestate.
In seabrook v. Seabroolk, 1 McMullan 201, the testator devised
portions of his property to his children severally, directing that
if either of them died without issue, their iiiterest should revert
to his estate, and then go to his right heirs forever. Upon the
death of one of the sons without issue, the wife of the testator
claimed under the statute, as heir at law, a portion of his share
which had reverted to the original estate.
The Chancellor, in deciding the case, remarked, "that ' the court
is unable to find a better definition of an heir than the person in
whom the estate vests, by operation of law on the death of the
one last seised. In order to ascertain who is the heir, it is neces-
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sary only to inquire to whom, by the law of the land, would the
estate pass in case of intestacy. The result of the examination
thus far is, that the share of Joseph E. Seabrook, on his death
would pass to those who were the right heirs of the testator; and
his widow would be included in that description." Owing to a
clause in the will which provided that the specific bequest to the
widow, should be received by her in lieu of dower, and a third
interest allowed by law to the wife-whenever the husband died
intestate; her petition in that case was denied. But on the death
of another son without issue, she again presented her claim, when
the court upon full argument, and an able review of the authorities, came to the following conclusion : that "1the devise over to
his right heirs was therefore void, and the testator died intestate
as to his reversionary interest in the estate given to his son Robert
E. Seabrook. It then follows that the widow is entitled to one
third, unless she is barred by the provisions of the will ;" which
the court held did not debar her of the right to inherit as heir;
10 Rich. Eq. 495.
Ferguson v. Stuart, 14 Ohio 140, was a case when the testator
devised his real estate to his executors to convert into money,
and when converted, to be deposited where his widow could draw
one third of the interest annually; the principal to go to his
heirs. The testator died without issue, and the law of Ohio provided
that when the husband should die intestate, leaving no heirs other
than such as were shown to have existed in that case, the widow
took by descent all the personal estate of her deceased husband.
The court in delivering the opinion upon the effect of the will
says "the law determines who are a man's heirs, and in this case
leaves that portion of the estate not specifically disposed of by
the will, to the statute of descents and distributions, to designate
the heirship, precisely as though no will had been made, and the
fact that a provision has been made for the wife by the will does
not prevent her from being an heir."
Apply the principle established by these decisions, to the present case, and it seems quite clear that so much of the property
of the testatrix as is not specifically disposed of by the will,
should, in view of inheritance, be treated as intestate estate. The
course of descent has not been altered by it, and the object of the
statute was to control the disposition of every estate, where the
owner had not provided for its taking a different direction.
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It was urged with great earnestness, that inasmuch as the testatrix had, by a previous clause in the will, given to her husband
a specific sum of money, she consequently intended to exclude him
from the. right to share in the surplus, if any remained.
There is not a word in the will indicating any such inference,
unless the mere fact that a specific bequest to the heir, operates
to exclude him from sharing in the remainder of the estate undisposed of. No case declaratory of such a doctrine has been
referred to, because, it is believed, none could be found.
The reasons why the testatrix gave the legacy to her husband
and did not then intend to cut him off from sharing in the
remainder of.the estate, may have been as various as human passions, and human motives vary. It is a sufficient answer to say,
that so speaks the written will, and the court has no authority to
change the language. What the testatrix intended by the words
"heirs at law," we have already seen can be determined only by
giving to theA their ordinary legal meaning, unless it clearly
appears from the will that they were used in a different sense.
To suppose that the words were used as it is insisted by counsel
they are commonly understood in the neighborhood, to signify
next of kin, or as they are sometimes alluded to even by lawyers
and judges, in contradistinction to husband and wife, would be
to guess at an intention that must result in unsettling the longestablished rules of construction, and give to them a meaning
capable of as many interpretations of intention as there are different loose local understandings respecting their use., The order of the County Court is affirmed at the cost of the
appellant.

United State8 Circuit Court. ljiVtrict of Arkansas.
THE UNITED STATES v. CLAYTON.
The governor of a state is not " an officer of election" within the meaning of
section 22 of the Act of Congress of May 31st 1870 (16 Stats. at Large 145),
which makes it criminal for any "1election officer" fraudulently to make any false
certificate of the result of any congressional election.
Statutes creating crimes will not be extended by judicial interpretation to cases
not plainly and unmistakably within their terms.
In statutes creating and defining criminal offences, the courts will not, by construction, engraft words in one section upon those of another, unless the legislative intention be plain and clear.

VoL. XIX.-47

UNITED STATES v. CLAYTON.
The relations of a state to the General Government, and of the governor to both,
referred to as showing the improbability that Congress would (if its power be
conceded) provide for the trial and imprisonment of this officer for omitting or
fraudulently performing election duties prescribed by state laws.
Tins was an indictment founded upon sect. 22 of the Act of Congress

of May 31st 1870 (16 Stats. at Large 145). The indictment was in
substance as follows: That on November 8th 1870 an election was
holden under the laws of Arkansas, in the several counties (naming
them) Aonstituting the Third Congressional District of the state, to
elect a Representative in the Congress of the United States; that Thomas
Boles and John Edwards were, respectively, candidates for that office,
and voted for at said election ; that abstracts, duly made and certified
by the county clerks of the said counties composing the Congressional
district, of the returns of said election in the various election districts
(duly made to said county clerks by the judges and clerks of said election, showing the number of votes cast, respectively, for Boles and Edwards, were filed in the office of the secretary of state; that on said 8th
day of November 1870, and for four months thereafter, the defendant,
Clayton, was the Governor of the state of Arkansas, charged with the
duty of making and granting the certificate hereinafter Vientioned ; that
during said period one Robert J. T. White was secretary of state; that
December 1st 1870 said White, in the presence of the defendant, Clay
ton, as governor, did duly cast up and arrange the said votes from the
said several counties so returned as aforesaid ; that on February 20th
1870 the defendant, as governor, did wilfully, unlawfully, and fraudulently make and grant, under the seal of the state, and deliver to said
Edwards a certificate, stating therein "that it appears from the returns
made to the office of the secretary of state, that at an election held, &c.,
John Edwards was duly elected in the Third Congressional District to
represent the state of Arkansas in the Forty-second Congress of the
United States."
The indictment then alleged that the said certificatewas false and fraudulent, and that "in truth and fact, it did not appear,
at the time it was made, by and upon such returns so made as aforesaid,
that said Edwards was elected; but, on the contrary, it did then and
there, as aforesaid, appear by said returns that the said Boles was duly
elected by a majority of one hundred votes. All of which said Clayton
well knew; contrary," &c.
The election laws of the state of Arkansas in substance provide that
the governor shall appoint registrars of elections ; that the board of
registrars shall appoint judges of election, and the judges the clerks of
election. The judges certify to the number of votes given to each
person, which is attested by the clerks. The judges are to transmit the
poll-books to the county clerks "within three days after the closing of
the polls." " On the fifth day after the election the county clerks are
to open and compare the returns and make abstract of the votes given
for the several candidates, and send certified copies of the abstracts to
the secretary of state." The act provides that "It shall be the duty of
the secretary of state, in the presence of the governor, within thirty
days, or sooner if all the returns are received, to cast up and arrange
the votes from the several counties for the person voted for for member
of Congress; and the governor shall, immediately thereafter, issue his
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proclamation declaring the person having received the highest number
of votes to be duly elected to Congress, and shall grant a certificate
thereof, under the seal of the state, to the person so elected :" Laws of
Arkansas, 1868, 314, 335.
The defendant demurred to the indictment.
Barrington,District Attorney (with whom were Whipple, Thompson,
and Barnes), for the United States.
Wilsire, Gantt, Warwick, and Yonley, for defendant.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
DILLON, Circuit Judge.-The indictment against the defendant who
was at the time of issuing the certificate of election to Edwards, the Governor of the *tate of Arkansas, is founded upon sect. 22 of the Act of
Congress of May 31st 1870 (16 Statutes at Large 145). The amendatory Act of February 28th 1871 (Id. 438) does. not apply to the case,
since the indictment is for an act committed before its passage, and is
not based upon sect. 20, which this last-named statute amended, but
alone upon sect. 22 above mentioned. This section provides, "That
any officer of any election, at which any representative or delegate in the
Congress of the-United States shall be voted for, whether such officer
of election be appointed or created by or under any law or authority of
the United States, or by or under any state, territorial, district, or muni.
cipal law or authority, who shall neglect or refuse to perform any duty
;n regard to such election required of him by any law of the United
States, or of any state or territory thereof; or violate any duty so imposed, or knowingly do any act thereby unauthorized, with intent to
affect any such election or the result thereof; or fraudulently make any
false certificate of the result of such election in regard to such representative or delegate, * * shall be deemed guilty of a crime and liable
to prosecution and punishment therefor," by fine or imprisonment, or
both.
The indictment necessarily proceeds upon the theory that the defendant, although the act charged against him was one required by the
laws of the state to be done by him in his capacity as governor, was, within
the meaning of the section of the Act of Congress just quoted, an officer
of election. and as such issued and delivered to Edwards the certificate of
election which is alleged to be fraudulent. Accordingly, one of the
counsel for the government well observed on the argument that a decisive question here was whether the defendant, within the intention of
Congress, was, or was not, an election officer, and acting as such in
making and delivering the election certificate set out in the indictment.
If he is not an election officer, it was admitted that the indictment
against him would not lie. To this fundamental inquiry, then, we first
direct our attention; for, if this question be resolved against the government, that is an end of the case, and it is unnecessary to consider
whether Congress has the constitutional power to provide for the punishment of state officers in respect to acts performed by them, as such,
under state authority. And so in this event it would be equally unnecessary to determine whether, if the defendant were an election officer,
the indictment sufficiently avers it, or charges the offence with the particularity required by the rules of criminal pleading.
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The Act of Congress, in the section under consideration, provides for
the punishment of "any officer of election" who shall "fraudulently
make any false certificate of the result of any election in regard to a Representative" in Congress. The question is one as to the meaning of the
phrase "officer of election" or "election officer." What was the scope of
legislative intention ? Undoubtedly this language was designed to include, and does appropriately include, local judges and clerks of election
at which a Representative iu Congress is voted for. But did Congress
mean, by this language, to include the chief executive officer of a state ?
Did it mean to include in any case an official act of the governor of a
state, and to provide for his punishment, if he shall neglect or refuse to
perform any duty imposed by state laws in respect to elections for Congress, or shall violate any such duty? Did it mean to include by this
description an official act of the governor, which in any case cannot be
done until thirty days or more have elapsed since the election was
holden and the polls closed, and which in the case made by the indictment was not done by him until nearly four months after the election
had ended? Is the act of the governor of the state, in granting the
certificate of election, the act of an election officer ?
This is, as above observed, a question of legislative intention. Now,
in what manner do the courts ascertain the legislative will? We
answer, that it is ascertained primarily and chiefly by the language the
legislature has used to express its meaning. We must suppose that in
the enactment of statutes, particularly statutes so important as the one
under consideration, Congress weighed well the words it employed.
In the office of interpretation, courts, particularly in statutes that create
crimes, must closely regard and even cling to the language which the
legislature has selected to express its purpose. And where the words
are not technical, or words of art, the presumption is a reasonable and
strong one that they were used by the legislature in their ordinary,
popular, or general signification. Statutes enjoin obedience to their requirements, and unless the contrary appears it is to be taken that the
legislature did not use the words in which its commands are expressed
in any unusual sense. For these reasons, whose cogency is obvious, the
law is settled that in construing statutes the language used is never to
be lost sight of, and the presumption is that the language is used in no
extraordinary sense, but in its common every-day meaning. When
courts, in construing statutes, depart from the language employed by
the legislator, they incur the risk of mistaking the legislative will, or
declaring it to exist where, in truth, it has never found any expression.
The legitimate function of courts is to interpret the legislative will, not
to supplement it or to supply it. The judiciary must limit themselves
to expounding the law; they cannot make it. It belongs only to the
legislative department to create crimes and ordain punishments. Accordingly courts, in the consideration of statutable offences, have always
regarded it as their plain duty cautiously to keep clearly within the expressed will of the legislature, lest otherwise they shall hold an act or
omission to be a crime, and punish it, when, in fact, the legislature had
never so intended or meant to declare. "If this rule is violated," says
Chief Justice BEST, "the fate of the accused person is decided by the
arbitrary discretion of the judges, and not by the express authority of
the laws: Fletcher v. Lord Sondes, 3 Bing. 580.
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The principle that the legislative intent is to be found, if possible, in
the enactment itself, and that the statutes are not to be extended by
construction to c.ises not fairly and clearly embraced in their terms, is
one of great imp-rtance to the citizen. The courts have no power to
create offences; but if by a latitudinarian construction they construe
cases not provided for to be within legislative enactments, it is manifest
that the safety and liberty of the citizen are put in peril, and that the
legislative domain has been invaded. Of course an enactment is not to
be frittered away by forced constructions, by metaphysical niceties, or
mere verbal and sharp criticism. Nevertheless the doctrine is fundamental in English and American law, that there can be no constructive
offences ; that before a man can be punished his case must be plainly
and unmistakably within the statute, and if there be any tir doubt
whether the statute embraces it, that doubt is to be resolved in fivor
of the accused. These principles of law admit of no dispute, and have
often been declared by the highest courts and by no tribune more
clearly than the Supreme Court of the United States : United Sates v.
Morris, 14 Pet. 464; United States v. lViltberger, 5 Wheat. 76 ; fUnted
States v. Sheldon, 2 Id. 119. And see also Ferrettv. Aticill, 1 3latchf.
151, 156 ; Sedgw. Const. and St. Law, 324, 326, 334 ; 1 Bish. Cr. Law,
sects. 134, 135.
In view ofIthese acknowledged rules of law, the question occurs : Did
Congress mean by the use of the words "officer of election," or "election
officer," in the section of the statute on which the indictment is framed,
to include the governor of a state ? Is the governor an election officer ?
It seems to us not. These words are apt and usual words to describe
the clerks and judges of the election, but not to describe the governor
of a state. Such is not their ordinary or usual meaning. To make them
apply to the executive of a state, in respect to an act done a month or
more after the election is closed, would be a forced and unnatural
meaning, and one which is not necessary in order to give the statute
effect or operation.
We hazard nothing in saying that, in popular use, no one, would
naturally infer that the words "officer of election" included the chief
executive of a state.
Other considerations fortify the conclusion that Congress did not
intend to provide for the indictment of the governor of a state. The
states are integral and indestructible parts of the General Government,
without which it cannot exist: Texas v. Wtite, 7 Wallace 700; and
in view of this relation, and of the high position and important relation
of the executive of a state to the United States, as well as to the state
itself, it would seem very improbable that Congress would undertake to
punish the governor for omitting or fraudulently discharging the duties
enjoined by the laws of his state. The punishment by imprisonment
would result in depriving the people of a state of the executive officer
they had elected, and prosecutions of this kind, if authorized, could not
fail frequently to lead to agitation, and disturb that harmony which
should exist between the state and its people and the General Government. Under the Constitution (art. 1, sect. 4), Congress has the undoubted, power to provide its own officers for the holding and conduct
of Congressional elections, and it would most probably exercise it, if it
deemed it necessary, in preference to undertaking to make or treat the

